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PREFACE 
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been written by Carlos Mendez, Stefan Kah and John Bachtler. It should be noted that the 
paper was revised following the IQ-Net meeting on 13-15 December to take account of the 
discussions and conclusions drawn at the meeting.  
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EPRC thanks all those who participated in the research. EPRC also gratefully acknowledges 
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contributions are co-financed by technical assistance from the European Structural Funds. 
The report is, however, the responsibility of the authors alone. The partners in the IQ-Net 
network are as follows: 
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Finland 
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x Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
France 
x Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité 
régionale (DATAR) 
Germany 
x Nordrhein-Westfalen, Ministry of Economy, SMEs and Energy, EU Affairs Unit 
x Sachsen-Anhalt, Ministry of Finance 
Greece 
x Management Organisation Unit of Development Programmes S.A. 
Hungary 
x Hungarian Enterprise Development Centre (MAG), in association with the 
National Development Agency (NDA) 
Italy 
x Lombardia Region, DG Industry, SMEs, Cooperation and Tourism 
x Ministry of Economic Development 
x Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPI) 
Poland 
x ĦlĎskie Voivodeship (Marshal’s Office) 
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x Financial Institute for Regional Development (IFDR) 
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x Government Office for Local Self-Government and Regional Policy, 
EU Cohesion Policy Department 
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x Tillväxtverket, Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
United Kingdom 
x Department of Communities and Local Government 
x ONE NorthEast 
x Scottish Government 
x Welsh European Funding Office 
 
For further information about IQ-Net, and access to the full series of IQ-Net Papers, please 
visit the IQ-Net website at: www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/default.cfm
Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the IQ-Net Consortium. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
The 2006 reform of Cohesion policy has marked a watershed in the policy’s history by 
explicitly aligning its governance architecture with the EU’s overarching growth and jobs 
strategy, the Lisbon agenda. The aim of this paper is: to examine the progress with 
implementing the Lisbon agenda at the national and programme levels; to indentify the 
challenges faced by programme managers in managing and implementing Lisbon-related 
priorities and interventions; to explore the different strategies and mechanisms employed 
to facilitate the management and implementation of Lisbon interventions; and to identify 
lessons for improving the delivery of the Lisbon agenda and to contribute to the Europe 
2020 strategy. 
The Lisbonisation of Cohesion policy 
Central to the new strategic approach for Cohesion policy in 2007-2013 is the explicit 
alignment of the policy with the Lisbon agenda. This has been established through three 
procedural innovations: Community Strategic Guidelines and National Strategic Reference 
Frameworks; (ii) the earmarking instrument to encourage the allocation of expenditure to 
Lisbon-related interventions; and (iii) strategic reporting to the Council of Ministers on the 
achievement of objectives, as well as a closer alignment with annual reporting on the 
National Reform Programmes.  
The NSRFs prepared by Member States were mostly broad with less focus and strategic 
influence than anticipated by the CSG. Many were based on existing domestic policies and 
strategies. However, comparative analysis of the NSRFs found evidence of the explicit 
‘Lisbonisation’ of strategies common to all EU27 Member States. The preparation of 
coherent, comprehensive, long-term national development strategies was also an 
innovation for some Member States, especially among the EU12.  
Analysis of strategies and spending choices at the level of Operational Programmes also 
found the CSG and earmarking requirements as having a powerful influence on planned 
Structural Funds expenditure. The most obvious impact was on the importance accorded to 
innovation, knowledge and entrepreneurship in virtually all programmes. There was less 
consistency in the way that Member States responded to the guideline relating to regional 
attractiveness.  
Changes made to implementation arrangements for the 2007-13 period sought to increase 
the strategic management of programmes. Project selection systems employed ‘thematic 
targeting’ on Lisbon-related (and urban) projects, efforts were made to increase the 
involvement of the private sector, and new monitoring indicators and evaluation practices 
were introduced.  
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Strategic reporting on mid-term achievements  
Member States are required to elaborate two strategic reports by the end of 2009 and 2012, 
analysing the contribution of their programmes and NSRF towards Cohesion policy 
objectives, the Community Strategic Guidelines and the Integrated Guidelines for Growth 
and Jobs. The first strategic reports, produced at the end of 2009, vary in content, length 
and language. Assessment of the reports by the European Commission indicates that overall 
progress towards the Lisbon objectives has been slow. Without taking into account the 
ongoing effects of the crisis, the EU would only reach 75 points by 2010, which is half the 
speed of change that would have been needed to achieve the targets. At the level of 
thematic priorities, the main EU-wide findings reported by the Commission included:  
x good progress in the innovation and research potential theme in both Convergence 
and RCE regions, though with striking disparities across Member States;  
x similarly varied performance under the entrepreneurship theme (support for 
advanced services and self-employed/start-ups), reflected in high commitments in 
a number of countries;  
x particularly strong progress in the ‘other investment in firms’ with over 40 percent 
of allocations committed to projects; 
x satisfactory progress under the human capital and labour market thematic 
priorities, but delays in some Member States under the social inclusion theme; and 
x delays in the capacity building and partnership theme across the EU. 
Reporting on outputs and results was patchy, with many reports not providing any 
quantitative information or qualitative assessment. The reporting of evaluation findings was 
limited for similar reasons.  
Despite the limited availability of data or evaluation evidence on achievements, the reports 
generally presented a positive picture of performance and of the outlook for the rest of the 
period. Nevertheless, ‘systemic obstacles’ to speedy implementation were reported, 
including EU-level delays on budget and regulatory agreement, changes in financial control 
rule, the complexity of managing overlapping programmes, domestic institutional problems, 
and the effects of the economic crisis.  
In reviewing the measures employed to overcome any difficulties faced, most reports 
confirmed the continued relevance of the agreed strategies. Among the main crisis 
response measures used were administrative simplification to reduce burdens on 
beneficiaries, the use of internal flexibility within priorities and the modification in 
financial allocations between priorities or changes in co-financing rates.  
Many reports did not outline any recommendations for improving performance in the years 
ahead, beyond the need to accelerate the overall implementation of the NSRF and 
programmes. From this perspective, the main goal for the future is one of maintaining 
rather than changing strategic focus.  
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre vi
Taking Stock of Programme Progress:  
Implementation of the Lisbon Agenda and Lessons for Europe 2020 
Lisbon and the Operational Programmes  
Analysis of the Annual Implementation Reports at the level of individual programmes 
reinforces the picture obtained from the strategic reports. Comparisons between the initial 
programme allocations to earmarked categories and the funds committed to earmarked 
categories by the end of 2009 show significant differences in progress between 
programmes. While some programmes, especially in RCE regions, record high levels of funds 
committed (as a proportion of overall funding allocated, and in absolute terms), others 
appear to have found the implementation of earmarked funding to be challenging, notably 
under some Convergence programmes. 
Qualitative analysis of programme performance since the start of 2007 indicates that IQ-Net 
programmes have been affected by a range of external and internal factors including 
compliance issues, the economic crisis, and deficiencies of administrative capacity and 
experience. The two factors with the most negative impact on the implementation of 
Lisbon measures are related to the administrative time and effort required for programme 
implementation, especially the parallel management of 2000-06 programme closure and the 
2007-13 programme. Nevertheless, the impact of these factors is not perceived to have had 
a major impact on programme management and the state of absorption of funds is 
generally assessed in positive terms. 
Key trends in the arrangements of many countries and programmes at the start of the 2007-
13 period included stronger strategic management, investment in capacity for programme 
delivery, changes to partnership arrangements and new coordination arrangements. These 
trends were by no means universal, with change being far more limited where delivery 
arrangements were firmly embedded or mature, and where the Lisbon ‘turn’ in Cohesion 
policy fitted well with existing strategic and implementation frameworks. Early experiences 
with implementation have generally not required further changes to the delivery 
arrangements set up at the outset, although measures have been put into effect to deal 
with some of the challenges reviewed in the previous section. In responding to these 
challenges and in advancing programme goals more generally, the main strategic and 
operational measures of relevance are coordination activities, the acceleration of spending, 
broader programme delivery and administration actions, and project animation and 
selection processes.  
With respect to monitoring and evaluation, the Lisbon ‘turn’ has had two key effects on the 
monitoring of programmes. First, the shift in the thematic content of programmes has, 
unsurprisingly, led to a shift in the types of indicators used, with a greater focus on Lisbon-
related priorities (RTD, innovation, renewable energies etc.) than in the past, both in terms 
of context indicators and also in relation to outputs and results. Nevertheless, programme 
monitoring remains heavily focused on financial performance (spending) rather than policy 
outcomes (outputs and results). Second, and related, Managing Authorities have had to 
incorporate the earmarking codes into their monitoring systems, and these are now 
routinely used for financial planning, monitoring and reporting purposes.  
However, there is great variation across the programmes in the indicators for measuring 
outputs and results. There appears to be little consistency in the core indicators used, the 
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benchmarks and targets established. Initial plans for monitoring have had to be revised in 
some cases because of methodological difficulties. From a very small sample of IQ-Net 
programmes where data were already available, there were several examples of good 
progress with output achievement. 
Finally, the Lisbonisation of programme has also influenced evaluation plans. To date, only 
a limited number of evaluations have been undertaken at programme level and these have 
often been on operational issues. However, many evaluations are currently being launched 
or planned at the mid-term stage with a strong focus on Lisbon objectives and themes.  
Lessons for Europe 2020 
The first lesson is the need for Europe 2020 to have a territorial dimension with a clearer 
spatial strategy and commitment to cohesion. Further, Managing Authorities underlined the 
importance of securing local and regional understanding and ownership of EU and National 
Reform Programme objectives and of the implementation of the strategies.  
A message to emerge from the research and interviews in relation to the strategic planning 
framework is that more coherence is needed between Cohesion policy strategies, EU 
objectives and National Reform Programmes.  
With regard to programming, Managing Authorities tend to agree on the need for greater 
concentration on clearer and fewer objectives and thematic priorities. Greater 
concentration on objectives can also be achieved by ensuring that the programme planning 
process follows a comprehensive and logical framework, encompassing the identification of 
priorities, interventions and physical indicators. The earmarking instrument provides a 
useful tool to support concentration efforts, although it is not a sufficient condition in of 
itself, particularly given the breadth of categories in the classification and the provisions to 
allow additional categories to be negotiated in NSRFs. A key message that has come 
through, however, is the need for more precisely defined earmarking categories and 
uniform reporting of data.  
Moving from programming to implementation, the core message from Managing Authorities 
is the need for genuine simplification. Many consider that the main problem relating to 
‘Lisbon’ is that the EU-level does not focus sufficiently on the content of the programmes 
but instead concentrates on bureaucratic rules.  
Finally, scope for improvement in strategic reporting was identified in three main areas. 
More coherence and alignment with reporting on national reform programmes is needed. 
Additionally, there is a need for more proactive involvement of regions in the strategic 
reporting exercise and to open it up to other interested actors (local authorities, cities, 
socio-economic partners, NGOs etc.). A coherent and comparable methodological 
framework of core indicators is required from the start of the next period.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2006 reform of Cohesion policy has marked a watershed in the policy’s history by 
explicitly aligning its governance architecture with the EU’s overarching growth and jobs 
strategy, the Lisbon agenda. The key procedural innovations to achieve this were: the 
establishment of a new planning framework involving the adoption of Community Strategic 
Guidelines and National Strategic Reference Frameworks centred on the Lisbon agenda; the 
identification of Lisbon-related categories of expenditure and financial targets through an 
earmarking instrument; and strategic reporting to the Council of Ministers on achievements.  
The Lisbon agenda was scheduled to end in 2010, and has now been superseded by a new 
Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The Commission’s 
proposals were put forward in March 2010 and agreed by the Council of Ministers in June 
2010. What is striking about the process is the speediness of the consultation and the 
failure by EU institutions to engage in a systematic review of the successes and failures of 
the Lisbon strategy.1 Greater understanding of the role of EU Cohesion policy is of 
particular relevance, being the single most important EU financial instrument for delivering 
the EU’s Lisbon (and Europe 2020) objectives over the 2007-2013 period. While it is too 
early to provide a full assessment of the contribution of Cohesion policy at this current mid-
term juncture, it is possible to review the early experiences with implementation. More 
specifically, the key objectives of the paper are: 
x to examine the progress with implementing the Lisbon agenda through the National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks and Operational Programmes at the national and 
programme levels; 
x to indentify the challenges faced by programme managers in managing and 
implementing Lisbon-related priorities and interventions; 
x to explore the different strategies and mechanisms employed to facilitate the 
management and implementation of Lisbon-related priorities and interventions; and 
x to identify lessons for improving the delivery of the Lisbon agenda and Europe 2020 
strategy. 
The paper is based on desk research and an extensive set of fieldwork interviews conducted 
in September-October 2010 with national and regional Managing Authorities in 16 Member 
States - Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
desk-based research included analysis of national and Commission Strategic Reports 
                                                 
1 Pochet P (2020) What’s wrong with EU2020? Intereconomics (2010) Forum on Europe 2020 — A 
promising strategy?, Volume 45, Number 3, May/June 2010, pp. 136-70. 
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(2009/2010) and data, Annual Implementation Reports (2008 and 2009), evaluations and 
other programme specific documentation (such as domestic monitoring reports). 
The paper is structured as follows. It begins in Section 2 with a review of the reform of 
Cohesion policy in 2006, focusing on its alignment with the renewed Lisbon agenda and the 
strategic responses by the Member States to the new framework at the start of the 
programme period. The mid-term achievements at national level are then examined in 
Section 3, based on national and Commission Strategic Reports and financial 
implementation data. Section 4 turns to the programme level. It provides a review of 
financial and physical implementation, the main factors affecting performance, the 
strategies and measures adopted to optimise performance, and the role of monitoring and 
evaluation in assessing performance. The final section 5 provides an overall assessment and 
offers lessons for the future reform of Cohesion policy within the framework of Europe 
2020. 
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2. The Lisbonisation of Cohesion policy  
2.1 New strategic requirements for 2007-13 
Central to the new strategic approach for Cohesion policy in 2007-2013 is the explicit 
alignment of the policy with the EU’s overarching growth and jobs strategy, the Lisbon 
agenda.2 This has been established through three procedural innovations:  
x a planning framework involving the adoption of EU goals for the policy (Community 
Strategic Guidelines) based on the Lisbon agenda and national strategies to guide 
implementation (the National Strategic Reference Framework);  
x an earmarking instrument to encourage the allocation of expenditure to Lisbon-
related interventions; and 
x strategic reporting to the Council of Ministers on the achievement of objectives, as 
well as a closer alignment with annual reporting on the National Reform 
Programmes  
The roots of this strategic turn lie in the Lisbon agenda adopted by the European Council in 
2000. Its aim was to make the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010. This overarching 
goals was translated into an agenda of common objectives and measures, using both 
traditional EU policy instruments (directives, regulations and Community programmes) and 
a new open method of coordination involving the benchmarking, monitoring and reporting 
of Member States progress (e.g. in employment policy). Following a mid-term health check, 
which criticised the lack of progress on movement towards the set objectives and 
weaknesses in the delivery model, a renewed growth and jobs agenda was agreed in 2005. 
This included a streamlined set of integrated guidelines for growth and jobs (see Box 1). 
These guidelines have, in turn, informed the Community Strategic Guidelines (CSG) for 
Cohesion policy in the 2007-2013 period (see Box 2). Adopted in 2006, the purpose of the 
CSG was to foster an increase in the strategic content of cohesion policy with a view to 
strengthening synergies with, and helping to deliver, the objectives of the renewed Lisbon 
agenda.3 In line with the Lisbon objectives and the related integrated guidelines for 
growth and jobs, Cohesion policy would place more priority on investment in innovation, 
the knowledge economy, the new information and communication technologies, 
employment, human capital, entrepreneurship, support for SMEs or access to risk capital 
financing.  
 
                                                 
2 Mendez C (2011) The Lisbonization of EU Cohesion Policy: A Successful Case of Experimentalist 
Governance? European Planning Studies, 19: 3, pp. 519-537. 
3 Council Decision of 6 October 2006 on Community strategic guidelines on cohesion (2006/702/EC), 
21.10.2006, Official Journal of the European Union. 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre 3
Taking Stock of Programme Progress:  
Implementation of the Lisbon Agenda and Lessons for Europe 2020 
Box 1: Lisbon Strategy Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs 2005-2008 
 
Macroeconomic policies for growth and jobs 
1. To secure economic stability for sustainable growth; 
2. To safeguard economic and fiscal sustainability as a basis for increased employment; 
3. To promote a growth-and employment-orientated and efficient allocation of resources; 
4. To ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic stability and growth; 
5. To promote greater coherence between macroeconomic, structural and employment policies; 
6. To contribute to a dynamic and well-functioning EMU. 
Knowledge and innovation - engines of sustainable growth 
7. To increase and improve investment in R&D, in particular by private business; 
8. To facilitate all forms of innovation; 
9. To facilitate the spread and effective use of ICT and build a fully inclusive information society;  
10. To encourage the sustainable use of resources and strengthen the synergies between 
environmental protection and growth; 
11. To strengthen the competitive advantages of its industrial base; 
Making Europe an attractive area to invest and work 
12. To extend and deepen the Internal Market; 
13. To ensure open and competitive markets inside and outside Europe and to reap the benefits of 
globalisation; 
14. To create a more competitive business environment and encourage private initiative through 
better regulation; 
15. To promote a more entrepreneurial culture and create a supportive environment for SMEs; 
16. To expand and improve European infrastructure and complete priority cross-border projects; 
More and better jobs 
17. To implement employment policies aimed at achieving full employment, improving quality and 
productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion; 
18. To promote a lifecycle approach to work; 
19. To ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness and make work pay for job-
seekers, including disadvantaged people, and the inactive; 
20. To improve matching of labour market needs; 
21. To promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce labour market 
segmentation, having due regard to the role of the social partners; 
22. To ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage-setting mechanisms 
23. To expand and improve investment in human capital; 
24. To adapt education and training systems in response to new competence requirements. 
 
 
Box 2: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-13 
 
1. Making Europe and its regions more attractive places in which to invest and work 
x Expand and improve transport infrastructure 
x Strengthen synergies between environmental protection and growth 
x Address Europe’s intensive use of traditional energy sources 
 
2. Improving knowledge and innovation for growth 
x Increase and improve investment in RTD 
x Facilitate innovation and promote entrepreneurship 
x Promote the information society for all 
x Improve access to finance 
 
3. More and better jobs 
x Attract and retain more people in employment and modernise social protection systems 
x Improve adaptability of workers and enterprises and the flexibility of the labour market 
x Increase investment in human capital through better education and skills 
x Develop effective administrative capacity 
x Help maintain a healthy labour force 
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The NSRF has provided a new tool to translate the CSG into national strategies and 
strategically to steer the design of Operational Programmes towards EU objectives. In 
practical or operational terms, however, the main tool for achieving concentration on the 
Lisbon agenda is the earmarking instrument. This requires a minimum share of funding to 
be allocated to Lisbon-related categories of expenditure, at least 60 percent under the 
Convergence Objective and at least 75 percent under the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment (RCE) Objective for the EU as a whole. The targets are voluntary for the EU12.  
The Lisbon priority themes and Lisbon earmarking categories are set out in Annex IV of 
General Regulation 1083/2006, while the full list (including non-Lisbon themes/categories) 
is set out in Annex II of the Implementing Regulation 1828/2006 (see the Annex to this 
paper). The list is more restrictive under the RCE Objective, for which 32 out of the total 
86 categories of expenditure are classified as being Lisbon-compliant compared with 47 
categories under the Convergence Objective. For both Objectives, the main ERDF-funded 
Lisbon priorities are R&TD / innovation and entrepreneurship, the information society, 
some energy priority categories (on different forms of renewable energy) and a single 
category under the environmental protection priority (clean urban transport). The three 
ESF priorities - access to employment and sustainability, social inclusion and human capital 
– are classified as being Lisbon compliant in their entirety under both Convergence and RCE 
Objectives. The more flexible list permitted under the Convergence Objective includes all 
five categories within the information society priority and some categories within the 
priorities for energy (trans-European networks) and transport (railways, motorways, multi-
modal transport, airports, ports and trans-European networks).  
Table 1: Priority themes for Structural Funds support, 2007-13 
Priority themes (earmarking) Priority themes (not earmarked) 
 
x R&TD + innovation and entrepreneurship 
x Information society  
x Transport (partly, Convergence only)  
x Energy (partly) 
x Access to employment and sustainability 
x Social inclusion  
x Human capital 
 
x Transport (RCE Objective) 
x Environmental protection and risk 
prevention (except for clean urban 
transport)  
x Tourism  
x Culture  
x Urban and rural regeneration  
x Social infrastructure  
x Social partnership mobilisation 
x Institutional capacity  
x Outermost regions 
 
 
Some Member States have negotiated national exceptions with the Commission (Cyprus, 
France, Greece, Portugal and Spain). In these countries (see Table 2), additional priority 
theme codes are earmarked as Lisbon-relevant. 
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Table 2: Additional earmarked categories agreed in specific Member States 
Member 
State 
Sub themes Code Category 
Cyprus Culture & Social 75 Education infrastructure  
 Environment 50 Rehabilitation of industrial sites and contaminated land 
France Broadband 10 Telephone infrastructures (incl. broadband networks) 
Greece Culture & Social 75 Education infrastructure  
Culture & Social 75 Education infrastructure  
Environment 44 Management of household and industrial waste 
Environment 45 Management and distribution of water (drink water) 
Environment 46 Water treatment (waste water) 
Environment 53 Risk prevention (...) 
Portugal 
Territ. Dimension 61 Integrated projects for urban and rural regeneration 
Culture & Social 77 Childcare infrastructure  
Environment 45 Management and distribution of water (drink water) Spain 
Environment 46 Water treatment (waste water) 
Source: Annex ‘Analysis of data on priority themes in line with Lisbon Earmarking’ to the 
Commission’s Strategic Report 
 
The third procedural innovation to support the alignment of EU Cohesion policy with the 
Lisbon agenda is the introduction of Strategic Reporting. Member States have been required 
to submit two reports at the end of 2009 and 2012 to assess the achievement of NSRF and 
programme objectives and the challenges faced. These reports are synthesised by the 
Commission and sent to the Council and other EU institutions for examination and debate. 
Links with the reporting process of the broader Lisbon strategy have also been enhanced as 
the Member States annual reports on the National Reform Programmes now include a 
section on the contribution of Cohesion policy programmes.  
2.2 Strategic responses by Member States 
In preparing their NSRFs, the Member States were required to present a strategy based on 
analysis of ‘development disparities, weaknesses and potential’, taking a national approach 
(applicable to both Convergence and RCE regions) and outlining thematic and territorial 
priorities. IQ-Net research conducted in 2005-64 indicated that, in most cases, the NSRFs 
were broad (especially in federal countries or those with devolved economic development 
responsibilities), with less focus and strategic influence than anticipated by the CSG. Many 
were based on existing domestic policies and strategies; new analysis was only really 
undertaken in the EU12, Greece and Italy. However, they did appear to indicate a 
convergence of Cohesion policy strategies with the Lisbon agenda, albeit with different 
development models or overarching approaches to development. 
                                                 
4 Polverari L, McMaster I and Gross F (2005) A Strategic Approach to Cohesion? Development 2007-2013 
Strategies, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 17(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. Polverari L, McMaster I, Gross F, Bachtler J, Ferry M and Yuill D (2006) Strategic 
Planning for Structural Funds in 2007-13, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 18(2), European Policies 
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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The territorial choices of the NSRFs required a balance between longer-term, Lisbon-
oriented goals and shorter term, equity-related objectives. This was particularly evident in 
territorially diversified countries (e.g. Germany, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia). A significant 
number of countries – such as Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland – proposed 
some form of spatial concentration of resources on ‘growth poles’, ‘competitiveness poles’ 
or ‘excellence poles/systems’, implying a shift from areas in need to areas of potential 
(also within the areas of need). The territorial choices were particularly sensitive in the 
RCE regions and in those Member States which were losing significant amounts of funding 
(e.g. United Kingdom) or where overall Cohesion funding was low (e.g. Denmark, the 
Netherlands). While it was difficult to establish the relative weight placed on equity 
(support to lagging regions) or efficiency (national competitiveness and growth), in broad 
terms Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom seem more 
concerned with efficiency, whereas most other countries appeared to be aiming for a 
balance between competitiveness and cohesion.  
Overall, comparative analysis of the NSRFs suggested two major strategic shifts from 2000-
06 to 2007-13. First, there was evidence of the explicit ‘Lisbonisation’ of strategies 
common to all EU27 Member States.5 For some of the EU15, this was not particularly 
innovative, as the 2000-06 strategies were considered reasonably well aligned with the 
Lisbon goals. A second element of relative innovation concerned the preparation of 
coherent, comprehensive, long-term national development strategies. In the EU12, the 
NSRFs represented the first comprehensive and long-term strategy linked to substantial 
resources. 
The universal goal of all Member State frameworks was higher national growth and 
competitiveness. This was, however, addressed or interpreted in different ways by Member 
States in their NSRFs. Seven categories of coexisting, development objectives were 
identified by the IQ-Net research:6
x a competitive economy, to be achieved mainly through innovation, R&D and the 
knowledge economy, but also through support to the business sector (in virtually all 
Member States); 
x sustainable growth and employment - again found in basically every country, even 
when not mentioned explicitly as the main strategic goal of the NSRF (as in the case 
of Denmark); 
x quality of life and/or territorial attractiveness (in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Malta, but also in Austria, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom); 
x development of human capital and more general societal modernisation (in 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Spain); 
                                                 
5 Mendez C (2011) Op. Cit. 
6 Polverari et al (2006) Op. Cit. 
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x social cohesion (in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania and Portugal); 
x balanced territorial development/sustainable development (in Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
and Sweden); and 
x European or national convergence - an explicit strategic objective in Latvia, 
Romania, Slovakia among the EU12 and in Germany, Italy and Portugal among the 
EU15, although European convergence is de facto an overarching objective of the 
NSRFs of all new Member States. 
Analysis of strategies and spending choices at the level of Operational Programmes also 
found the CSG and earmarking requirements as having a powerful influence on planned 
Structural Funds expenditure.7 The most obvious impact was on the importance accorded to 
innovation, knowledge and entrepreneurship in virtually all programmes. Innovation was 
universally represented among the main themes set out for the 2007-13 period and, in the 
case of Regional Competitiveness strategies, innovation was generally the first priority. 
Programme documents stated that they planned to provide support across the range of 
interventions anticipated by the CSG - better targeted RTD investment, support for 
innovation and entrepreneurship, access to finance, information society, and human 
capital. There were clearly differences in approach to innovation, notably between 
Convergence and RCE programmes, the latter placing more emphasis on ‘softer’ and 
systemic interventions. 
There was less consistency in the way that Member States responded to the guideline 
relating to regional attractiveness. Several of the interventions under this heading were 
already an important feature of programmes, notably measures to strengthen the economic 
environment through investment in infrastructure and environmental improvement. In the 
NSRFs and OPs for 2007-13, the key distinction was between the Convergence or Phasing-
out programmes, where investment in major and strategic infrastructure remained eligible 
and affordable, and the RCE programmes where this is largely ineligible and too costly for 
programme resources. In the latter case, there was a shift to transport investment in 
logistics hubs and platforms, travel centres, traffic management systems and transport 
chains. In the field of ICT, standard interventions were designed to improve broadband 
connectivity, improve the quality and reduce cost of connections and accessibility, as well 
as the use of electronic services (e-government, e-commerce, e-learning). Support was also 
planned to strengthen synergies between environmental protection and growth. A 
distinctive characteristic of some OPs was the greater emphasis placed on investment in 
environmental technologies and renewable energy sources. 
These findings were reinforced by a meta-analysis of half of all ERDF and Cohesion Fund 
OPs which found a close alignment with the sub-headings of the CSG, but with different 
                                                 
7 Bachtler J, Ferry M, Mendez C and McMaster I (2007) The 2007-13 Operational Programmes: A 
Preliminary Assessment, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 19(2), European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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rankings of priorities.8 The Competitiveness programmes tended to focus on 
‘entrepreneurship, RTD and innovation’, in line with the knowledge society ethos of the 
Lisbon agenda. ‘Accessibility’ was generally, but not always, ranked amongst the top 
priorities of the Convergence programmes in the less developed regions, given their greater 
needs for basic infrastructure investment. However, this general picture masks wide 
variation in prioritisation. At least six ‘different paths to Lisbon’ were identified:  
x Competitiveness programmes: 1) R&TD and innovation (with limited environmental 
priority) (Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg, part of Netherlands); 2) employment, 
urban regeneration and energy (as well as R&TD and innovation) (Belgium, part of 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, partly Austria, Germany); 3) renewable energy, 
urban and rural development and tourism (as well as R&TD and innovation) (United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, partly Austria and Germany).  
x Convergence programmes: 4) transport and accessibility (Greece, Portugal, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus); 5) knowledge promotion and 
accessibility (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and 6) urban/rural infrastructure (Poland, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia). 
Finally, it is worth noting some of the changes made to implementation arrangements for 
the 2007-13 period.9 In particular, improvements were made to the strategic management 
of programmes, reflecting the regulatory requirements and Commission pressure for a more 
strategic approach from both policy and financial perspectives. The influence of the CSG 
was most evident in the project generation, appraisal and selection systems where specific 
measures to increase ‘thematic targeting’ on Lisbon-related (and urban) projects were 
introduced. The strategic framework of the Lisbon Agenda also prompted renewed efforts 
to increase the involvement of the private sector not only on advisory bodies and 
Monitoring Committees but also as active participants in the implementation process. New 
monitoring indicators were introduced, reflecting the thematic shifts in spending as well as 
the need to monitor funding at both OP and NSRF levels; and evaluation planning needed to 
be rethought to comply with multi-level evaluation requirements and (in some cases) the 
need to prepare for strategic reporting.10
                                                 
8 Nordregio (2009) Potential for EU Structural Funds to contribute to the Lisbon and Göteborg 
objectives for growth, jobs and sustainable development, Final Report, DG Regional Policy, Brussels. 
 
9 Ferry M, Gross F, Bachtler J and McMaster I (2007) Turning strategies into projects: the 
implementation of 2007-13 Structural Funds programmes, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 20(2), European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
 
10 Polverari L, Mendez C, Gross F and Bachtler J (2007) Making sense of European Cohesion policy: 
2007-13 on-going evaluation and monitoring arrangements, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 21(2), 
European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre 9
Taking Stock of Programme Progress:  
Implementation of the Lisbon Agenda and Lessons for Europe 2020 
3. Lisbon and the NSRFs  
Strategic reporting is one of the main governance innovations in the 2007-13 programme 
period. It requires the Member States to elaborate two strategic reports by the end of 2009 
and 2012, analysing the contribution of their programmes and NSRF towards Cohesion policy 
objectives, the Community Strategic Guidelines and the Integrated Guidelines for Growth 
and Jobs. For its part, the Commission is required to draw up a synthesis assessment of the 
national reports, which is transmitted to EU institutions for examination and debate. The 
core aim is to make Member States more accountable for the delivery of policy objectives, 
particularly relating to the overarching Lisbon objectives, and to encourage debate and 
learning about the effectiveness of Cohesion policy. 
3.1 Strategic Reporting: organisation, content and form  
Member States adopted different organisational approaches to strategic reporting. As the 
Report was required to review the NSRF, the drafting process was undertaken or 
coordinated at the national level. Some national bodies contracted the work - or parts of it 
- to external consultants (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Czech Republic), but most 
Member States undertook the task in-house, assigning the work to an existing national 
organisation with a coordination role or political responsibility for Cohesion policy. 
However, these were not the same organisations as those responsible for reporting on the 
broader Lisbon strategies (i.e. National Reform Programmes), except for Slovenia where the 
Managing Authority GOSP was able to exploit the synergies involved in discharging both of 
these tasks. 
The elaboration of the reports was seen as being administratively demanding in some 
countries, requiring additional staff to be employed. However, many national bodies, 
particularly in the EU12 but also in some of the EU15 (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal), were well-accustomed to the coordination of Cohesion policy monitoring and 
reporting processes. The main strategies or mechanisms used to ensure that the process 
was well structured, informed and coordinated included:  
x setting up strategic reporting working groups (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Slovenia);  
x embedding the exercise within annual reporting or evaluation planning processes 
(Austria, Poland, Portugal, Spain);  
x making use of evaluation studies that had been commissioned to feed into the 
strategic report (France, Portugal); and  
x benefitting from governmental strategic reflections and evidence to territorial 
reviews of regional (including EU cohesion) policies for the OECD (Portugal and 
Sweden). 
In general, the strategic reporting exercise did not have a high public profile. Domestic 
accountability for the exercise could have been enhanced though public consultations (as 
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was reportedly the case in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Malta), but this approach was not used in 
most Member States. A more pro-active effort was made in Sweden, where the strategic 
report and the recent OECD Territorial Review were used to draw up a report that was sent 
to the Parliament for examination and debate, entitled ‘Strategic growth efforts for 
regional competitiveness, entrepreneurship and employment’.  
Turning to the content and form of the reports, the General Regulation was relatively 
unprescriptive, only specifying the need: to review the socio-economic situation and 
trends; to identify the achievements, challenges and future prospects in relation to 
implementation of the agreed strategy; and to provide examples of good practice. 
Nevertheless, the Commission did provide guidance to the Member States,11 mainly to 
ensure that certain key topics were covered, such as the response to the economic crisis, 
and that the Member States provided the Commission with the necessary data to undertake 
its own pan-EU assessment of financial progress.  
The key issues raised by the Commission in its guidance were covered in many of the 
reports, albeit with varying degrees of depth and rigour. The length of the reports, for 
instance, ranged from fewer than 50 pages (e.g. Belgium, excluding annexes) to over 300 
pages (Spain), although page length was not necessarily an indication of quality or rigour.  
Also of note is that few Member States translated their reports to another EU working 
language, perhaps surprising given that a key aim of the exercise was to encourage mutual 
learning across countries. Exceptions include the reports of Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania (which were translated into English) and some 
executive summaries (Greece, Poland, Spain). A further obstacle to accessibility and cross-
national dissemination and examination of the findings is that the reports were not all 
made available on the Commission’s website (unlike the NRP annual monitoring reports, for 
instance); only a limited number can be directly downloaded from the strategic reporting 
section of DG Regio’s website, in many cases providing links to national websites instead 
where the reports are not always easily visible or accessible. 
3.2 The socio-economic situation and trends 
The point of departure for the strategic reports is an update of the socio-economic 
situation and trends since the formulation of the NSRFs. The major development is of 
course the economic crisis, and most reports discussed the important consequences for 
economic activity, the business environment, labour market and public finances at national 
and regional levels. Assessing the impact of the crisis on the regions was not always 
straightforward, being hampered in many cases by lags in the availability of data at sub-
national level, with the exception of labour market data.  
Some reports provided overviews of the changing national and regional policy environment 
in response to the new scenario, particularly regarding domestic crisis measures at national 
or regional level (e.g. Spain), but often in a rather general form (e.g. United Kingdom). 
                                                 
11 DG Regio (2009) Information note: Indicative structure for the national strategic reports 2009, 
COCOF 09/0018/01-EN, European Commission, Brussels.  
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Different to most other reports, Austria’s socio-economic analysis included a forward-
looking appraisal of future regional policy directions on the basis of prospective studies and 
discussions within its NSRF monitoring structure (Box 3). 
Box 3: 2030 Spatial Development Scenarios in Austria 
 
The trends and challenges for Austria's regional policy are discussed annually within the so-called 
‘STRAT.ATplus’ process. Drawing on this work - including a study on the 2030 spatial development 
scenarios for Austria12 and the Commission’s Regions 2020 report13 - the Austrian Strategic Report 
highlights the following key messages.  
Globalisation and the increasingly knowledge-based nature of growth: Austria is undergoing a 
transition towards growth that is increasingly determined by research, technology and innovation. It 
has achieved the highest increase in R&D expenditure as a share of GDP in the EU15 since 2000 and is 
on target to reach the EU’s three percent target. Two challenges are highlighted: addressing the 
decline in growth which has resulted from the crisis; and designing a forward-looking strategy to 
ensure that the medium term goal of belonging to the group of leading innovation nations is not 
threatened. 
Demographic change: Austria's population is forecast to grow by three percent between 2008 and 
2015 (8 percent by 2030) due to migration flows, posing challenges for integration policies. These 
trends are not evenly distributed: above-average growth for Vienna and Niederösterreich; moderate 
growth in the Western Länder; and stagnation or decline in the South. Population will continue to 
grow in agglomerations, reaming stable in rural regions overall (but declining in inner-Alpine 
peripheral regions/valleys). The ageing population is also a challenge too in the 2030 time-frame. The 
ESF currently provides an important lever for addressing these challenges. 
Resources and energy scarcity: Bottlenecks related to the availability of commodities and energy 
became acute between 2007 and mid-2008, leading to high price rises and shortages. These 
challenges will intensify in the recovery from the crisis. Support for resource efficiencies, the 
substitution of commodities as well as the utilisation of alternative energies and new materials will be 
important fields of activity in the future. The ERDF already contributes to these tasks, but mostly 
national instruments are used in this context. 
Climate change: The increasing occurrence of extreme weather and associated damage, along with 
new scientific insights, have increased awareness of climate change and its consequences. The 
Commission published a white paper on climate change in April 2009, and several countries have 
developed corresponding strategies. The Austrian government has anchored the preparation of a 
national adaptation strategy by 2013 in its government agreement. 
 
 
The reviews of the socio-economic context and the evolving domestic policy environment 
were often presented as contextual background information. There was limited effort to 
distil specific strategic implications for the NSRFs or for longer-term policy directions, 
beyond general statements about the need for effective and efficient delivery in the 
difficult economic and budgetary climate. In part, this is due to the fact that many Member 
States do not use the NSRF as a strategic tool upstream of the programming phase - nor are 
they obliged to inform the Commission about modifications to their NSRFs where they do 
play a more substantive role - but also because strategic revisions to the NSRF were not 
generally seen as necessary. For instance, the updated socio-economic analysis in the 
Spanish report, one of the countries most acutely affected by the crisis, led to a revision of 
                                                 
12 ÖROK (2009) Szenarien der Raumentwicklung Österreichs 2030 - Regionale Herausforderungen und 
Handlungsstrategien, ÖROK-Schriftenreihe 176/II, Vienna. 
13 European Commission (2008) Regions 2020  An assessment of future challenges for EU regions, 
SEC(2008), Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels. 
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the NSRF’s SWOT analysis, but the report concluded that the strategy remained valid and, 
moreover, even anticipated some of the challenges faced in the current crisis context.  
Looking more specifically at Lisbon agenda objectives and indicators, the most recent EU-
wide analysis of the situation and trends in the regions is provided in the Fifth Cohesion 
Report.14 It uses the recently created ‘Lisbon index’, which measures how far regions are 
from eight Lisbon targets for 2010, to provide a snapshot picture of the situation in 2008 
and trends between 2000 and 2008.15 Beginning with the situation in 2008, the report 
reveals important variation in attainment. 
x The level of Lisbon attainment in Convergence regions was almost half that of the 
RCE regions average (with average index scores of 38 and 70 respectively) (see 
Table 3). Transition regions fared better (42) but were still well below the EU27 
average (of 68).  
x The top ten Lisbon achievers in 2008 included three Finnish regions (Länsi-Suomi, 
Etelä-Suomi, Pohjois-Suomi), four Swedish regions (Östra Mellansverige, 
Västsverige, Sydsverige, Stockholm) two United Kingdom regions (Hampshire and 
Isle of Wight, Lancashire) and one Danish region (Hovedstaden) scoring between 95 
and 100.  
x At the other end of the scale, the bottom ten comprised four Southern Italian 
regions (Sicilia, Campania, Calabria and Puglia), the two Portuguese island regions 
(Açores and Madeira), Malta, one Romanian region and two Hungarian regions 
(Észak-Magyarország and Dél-Dunántúl), all scoring fewer than 15 points on the 
Lisbon index. 
Table 3: Lisbon index 2008 and change 2000-2008 
Lisbon indicator 
Lisbon 
Target 
EU27 CONV TRANS RCE 
Employment rate of men aged 15-54 85 76 71 75 80 
Employment rate of women aged 15-54 64 64 57 59 69 
Employment rate of people aged 55-64 50 46 40 44 49 
Early school leavers aged 18-24 10 14 15 19 12 
Secondary education attainment of people aged 20-
24 
85 78 80 72 78 
Participation in life-long learning of people aged 25-
64 
12.5 9.4 5.3 8.6 11.6 
Business expenditure in R&D as % of GDP 2 1.2 0.4 0.5 1.4 
Government, higher education and non-profit 
expenditure in R&D as % of GSP 
1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 
Lisbon index 100 68 38 42 70 
Change in Lisbon index 2000-2008  11 7 10 9 
Source: Fifth Cohesion Report, p. 195 
                                                 
14 See also Annoni P and Kozovska K (2010) EU Regional Competitiveness Index 2010, JRC Scientific 
and Technical Reports, European Commission, Brussels.  
15 The methodology is explained in more detail in Dikstra L (2010) ‘The Lisbon Index’, Regional Focus, 
No3/2010, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels.  
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In terms of trends over time, EU regions have on average improved their score by 11 index 
points between 2000 and 2008. The 10 regions with the most rapid improvements were 
Corse in France (albeit from a low starting point), no fewer than seven Spanish regions (País 
Vasco, Cantabria, Navarra, Galicia, Asturias, La Rioja and Extremadura), Kärnten in Austria, 
and Liguria in Italy. But overall progress towards the Lisbon objectives has been slow across 
the board. On the basis of the reported trends, and without taking into account the ongoing 
effects from the crisis, the EU would only reach 75 points by 2010, which is half the speed 
of change that would have been needed to achieve the targets.16  
3.3 Achievements and future prospects  
The Strategic Reports employed several methods to assess Cohesion policy achievements 
and NSRF contributions to Lisbon objectives. A first approach involved examining the 
relationship between NSRF objectives/priorities and those of the Community Strategic 
Guidelines, European Employment Strategy and National Reform Programmes. Some reports 
provided quantitative matrix analyses of relative weightings, financial allocations or 
implementation progress to demonstrate the linkages (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Portugal, Spain), while others only provided schematic illustrations of the links or 
qualitative descriptions. A second source of evidence used to assess achievements was 
financial implementation data, also sent to the Commission to undertake a comparative EU-
wide assessment. The link to Lisbon objectives could be accordingly analysed at two levels: 
earmarking targets and progress in achieving them, which could be labelled a ‘narrow’ 
Lisbon approach given the restricted fields of intervention covered; and a ‘broad’ Lisbon 
approach encompassing the full range of priority themes and expenditure categories, all of 
which can be linked to the Community Strategic Guidelines and Lisbon agenda. A third 
method to account for actual policy outcomes was through the reporting of outputs and 
results data, including on the Commission’s core indicators. Aside from these standard 
monitoring and reporting approaches, a limited number of reports were able to draw on 
evaluation findings (e.g. France, Hungary, Portugal).  
The main challenges faced in using these methods and evidence sources for assessing 
achievements were five-fold.  
x At a conceptual level the Lisbon objectives are rather ambiguous - even though 
they may be clearly expressed and succinctly stated in EU strategies (the renewed 
Lisbon agenda and the CSG) and national plans (National Reform Programmes or 
NSRFs) - and methodologically difficult to assess for causal policy impacts.  
x Financial and physical data were limited – or non-existent in many cases – mainly 
due to the relatively late launch of the programmes. This explains why the 
Commission encouraged the Member States to report on projects or operations 
selected, rather than just payments.  
                                                 
16 Based on 2000-2007 data: Dikstra L (2010) Op. Cit. 
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x Very few evaluation studies of the current programmes had been completed. 
Where results were available, they were mainly concerned with operationalisation 
issues (e.g. France, Portugal, Hungary), although macro-economic impact 
assessments were also included in some of the reports (Hungary, Poland).  
x Some Member States faced challenges in aggregating data at the national level 
due to the different methodological approaches used across programmes and the 
logistical challenges in collecting the data (e.g. Germany).  
With these caveats in mind, the remainder of this section reviews the key findings of the 
reports on financial implementation progress, the challenges and measures employed to 
overcome difficulties, and recommendations for the remainder of the period and beyond. 
3.3.1 Financial implementation 
As noted above, assessing the financial performance of NSRFs and programmes in relation 
to Lisbon objectives and themes can be approached from a narrow or broad perspective. 
The earmarking categories constitute the narrow perspective by focusing on those areas of 
expenditure considered to be most relevant to the Lisbon agenda. However, the objective 
of all Cohesion policy spending is to contribute to growth and jobs. Accordingly, the three 
CSG and their various sub-headings can be linked to all of the thematic spending priorities 
and sub-divided categories of expenditure. Only some national reports presented financial 
performance data and analysis in this way (e.g. Austria, Hungary, Portugal), but the 
Commission published the national-level data sets along with a discussion of the key 
findings in its synthesis report.  
Before reviewing the comparative findings on financial implementation, two methodological 
caveats should be noted. First, the data relate to funding committed to operations 
(projects) not actual payments to implemented projects and therefore do not necessarily 
reflect the reality on the ground (to the extent that commitments many not be fully 
realised). Second, while the Commission requested cumulative data up to September 2009, 
many Member States provided data relating to a later date (Estonia, France, Slovenia, 
Spain) or from the end of 2008 (in the case of Germany).  
(i) Community Strategic Guidelines: the broad Lisbon perspective 
The first CSG is Attractive places to invest and work which includes the priority themes 
of rail, road and other transport, environment, energy, broadband and cultural and social 
infrastructures. By late 2009, project commitments across the EU were around a quarter of 
the total allocation to the guideline. Country project selection rates differed widely. Three 
Member States had already committed above 85 percent of their allocations (Luxembourg, 
Belgium and Ireland, the latter more than its allocation), while four Member States had not 
reached the level of 15 percent of their funding allocations (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and 
Greece). In examining the commitment profiles of different priority themes, the main 
messages reported by the Commission included the following:  
x although progress in transport was deemed satisfactory, commitments have been 
imbalanced by favouring roads and motorways over rail projects;  
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x there has been underperformance in the environmental theme; and 
x major delays have affected energy sector projects in many Member States 
(Bulgaria, Spain, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
United Kingdom) thus hindering the achievement of EU sustainable development 
objectives.  
Figure 2: Financial implementation of the CSG Attractive places to live and work 
(funding committed to operations as percentage of the total allocation) 
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Source: European Commission data 
 
The second CSG - ‘Improving knowledge and innovation for growth’ – is often considered 
to be the one most aligned with Lisbon agenda, at least at the level of policy discourse. 
Mainly funded through the ERDF, it encompasses the priority themes of RTDI, 
entrepreneurship, ICT and other investment in firms. Overall, the project commitment rate 
(29 percent of funds) was higher than under the other two guidelines. Again, financial 
performance was particularly high in Belgium, where more than three-quarters of the 
allocation had been committed (mainly in the ‘other investment in firms’ category), but 
also in Malta (‘RTD & innovation’ predominantly, for which the entire allocation had been 
committed). At the other end of the spectrum, seven Member States had committed only 
10-20 percent of funding (Greece, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, France and 
Denmark).  
At the level of thematic priorities, the main EU-wide findings reported by the Commission 
included:  
x good progress in the innovation and research potential theme in both Convergence 
and RCE regions, though with striking disparities across Member States;  
x similarly varied performance under the entrepreneurship theme (support for 
advanced services and self-employed/start-ups), reflected in high commitments in 
a number of countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Spain, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, 
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Slovenia, United Kingdom) and slow progress in others (Austria, Spain, Hungary, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Romania);  
x particularly strong progress in the ‘other investment in firms’ with over 40 percent 
of allocations committed to projects, largely because this category of expenditure 
played an important role in national and regional responses to the crisis. 
Figure 3: Financial implementation of the CSG Improving knowledge and innovation for 
growth (funding committed to operations as percentage of the total allocation) 
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Source: European Commission data 
 
The third CSG is ‘More and better jobs’, which is strategically anchored in the European 
Employment Strategy and funded by the ESF. Four priority themes are covered by this 
guideline: human capital; labour market; social inclusion; and capacity building. At EU 
level, the commitment rate was 26 percent by late 2009, the same rate as the first CSG. 
The cross-national range is again wide, although there is a much larger group of countries 
clustered around the average than under the previous CSGs. The top five countries are 
Belgium, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden and the Netherlands, all of which had commitment rates 
above 50 percent of their allocations. At the lower end of the scale were Slovakia, Czech 
Republic (around 10 percent or less), Romania and Spain (both under 20 percent). In 
between these two groups, commitment rates ranged between 25 and 45 percent.  
The key points raised in the Commission’s synthesis report were:  
x satisfactory progress under the human capital and labour market thematic 
priorities, but delays in some Member States under the social inclusion theme 
(notably in Austria, Slovakia, Spain and Germany); and 
x delays in the capacity building and partnership theme across the EU (especially in 
Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and United Kingdom), partly explained by the fact 
that delivery is through multi-ministerial programmes which can delay decision-
making. 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre 18
Taking Stock of Programme Progress:  
Implementation of the Lisbon Agenda and Lessons for Europe 2020 
Figure 4: Financial implementation of the CSG More and better jobs (funding 
committed to operations as percentage of the total allocation) 
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Source: European Commission data 
 
Aside from the three guidelines reviewed above, drawn directly from the EU’s 2005 
Renewed Lisbon agenda, the CSG document includes a second section entitled the 
‘territorial dimension’. While this dimension is arguably a transversal priority that cuts 
across many different interventions, the Commission’s Strategic Report identifies the 
European Territorial Cooperation programmes and four specific expenditure categories as 
being particularly relevant: assistance to improve tourism services; integrated urban and 
rural regeneration projects; compensation of any additional costs due to accessibility 
deficit and territorial fragmentation; specific action addressed to compensate additional 
costs due to size market factors; and support to compensate additional costs due to climate 
conditions and relief difficulties. The strategic reporting data showed that project 
commitments in the first two categories – for tourism and urban/urban regeneration – were 
strong (35 and 29 percent respectively), while commitments under the European Territorial 
Cooperation programmes were somewhat lower (around a quarter of their allocations).  
Summing up, the key priority areas facing delays or variable performance are in the rail 
sector, certain energy and environmental investments, investment in the area of the digital 
economy, social inclusion, and governance and capacity building. 
(ii) Earmarking: the narrow Lisbon perspective 
Turning to the narrower earmarking classification of Lisbon expenditure, the data published 
by the Commission on 2009 project commitments show that the targets set for the EU are 
being achieved. Under the Convergence Objective, 65.4 percent of all project 
commitments were on earmarked expenditure, slightly higher than the 64.5 percent ex-
ante targets agreed in the approved programmes (or five percentage points above the 60 
percent EU target set in the General Regulation). As can be expected, the overall figures 
mask wide variation. Of the 20 Member States receiving Convergence funding, just over half 
had exceeded their ex-ante targets:  
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x by 16 percentage points in the case of Latvia;  
x by 4-7 percentage points in a group of seven Member States (Portugal, Greece, 
Malta, Lithuania, Italy, Hungary and Estonia); and  
x by a slim margin in the remaining three countries (France, United Kingdom and 
Slovenia).  
Figure 5: Convergence earmarking targets (planned for 2007-13 and achieved in 2009) 
and earmarking financial absorption (project pipeline, 2009)  
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Source: European Commission data 
 
 
Countries with spending commitment below ex-ante earmarking targets can be divided into 
three groups:  
x 15 percentage points or more behind (Romania and Austria); 
x 5-10 percentage points behind (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Bulgaria, 
Belgium); and 
x marginally behind (Poland and Spain). 
The relative rankings are different for earmarked project commitment rates, which 
arguably provides a better indicator of the relative ease or challenges faced in spending the 
earmarked allocations during the lifetime of the programmes. Setting Belgium aside, which 
had already allocated three quarters of its earmarked allocation to projects, four groups 
can be identified:  
x above 50 percent of total funds allocated (Belgium, Estonia, Malta, Hungary);  
x 33-50 percent (Latvia, Italy, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Portugal, Lithuania, Spain);  
x 10-20 percent (Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Slovakia, 
Greece); and 
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x below 10 percent (Austria, Romania). 
Figure 6: RCE earmarking targets (planned for 2007-13 and achieved in 2009) and 
earmarking financial absorption (project pipeline, 2009) 
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Source: European Commission data 
 
Turning to the RCE Objective, spending on earmarked categories of expenditure was ahead 
of the ex-ante targets by a similar margin. Specifically, some 82 percent of EU expenditure 
allocated to projects was on earmarked categories, three percentage points above the 79 
percent ex-ante targets on programme approval (and seven percentage points above the 75 
percent target set for the EU in the General Regulation). As with the Convergence 
Objective, this average masks wide variation across Member States. Of the 19 Member 
States with RCE funding, 11 had exceeded their targets on the basis of 2009 data:  
x at the top end were Greece and Portugal, by 18 and 24 percentage points 
respectively;  
x by around 15 percentage points in Spain, Slovakia and Luxembourg; and 
x by 1-5 percentage points in France, Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Czech 
Republic, Austria  
In terms of the Member States that had under-committed in relation to their ex-ante 
targets:  
x two were only marginally behind (Germany, Slovenia);  
x a further three were between five and 10 percentage points behind (Finland, Italy, 
Cyprus, Belgium); and 
x one Member States was 20 percentage points behind (Ireland). 
A snapshot picture of the relative balance between earmarked and non-earmarked 
commitments in 2009 is not necessarily a reliable indication of future attainment of targets 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre 21
Taking Stock of Programme Progress:  
Implementation of the Lisbon Agenda and Lessons for Europe 2020 
or of financial performance. For instance, while Ireland was significantly behind its ex-ante 
earmarking targets, this was largely in line with the spending profile planned for the start 
of the period and, moreover, it was ranked in the top five countries in relation to the 
proportion of total funds committed to earmarked projects – behind Portugal, Netherlands 
(58 percent in both cases), Sweden and Belgium (over 45 percent). The remaining Member 
States can be divided into four groups, which had committed:  
x one third of their earmarked allocations (Greece, Cyprus, United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg, Denmark and France);  
x close to or above 20 percent of earmarked allocations (Italy, Finland, Czech 
Republic, Austria, Slovakia); and 
x at the bottom end, around 15 percent of earmarked allocations (Spain and 
Germany, though on the basis of 2008 data in the latter case). 
In reviewing the Strategic Reports, the main message that emerges is that financial 
implementation is generally regarded as being satisfactory and in line with NSRF and 
CSG priorities, notwithstanding the relatively low level of spending in many cases. For 
instance, Austrias project commitment rates were lower than the EU average, but the 
report states that implementation progress is on track and in line with the experience of 
the previous programme period. For Hungary, which reported one of the highest project 
commitment rates, the Strategic Report stated that the NSRF had progressed well in 
commitments, projects selected and spending, with promising forecasts for most 
programmes. Similar statements are provided in many other reports.  
Nevertheless, many of the reports identified significant variations across and within 
programmes, suggesting that absorption difficulties could arise in specific programmes or 
areas of intervention in the future.  
x In France, project commitment rates were reported to range from 12 percent (Ile 
de France) to 39 percent (Limousin ROP). Regarding the level of payments, the 
range was from 0.3 percent (PACA NOP) to 7.4 percent (ROP Limousin).  
x In Spain, the rate of certified expenditure over total allocations under the ERDF 
ranged between 3 percent (NOP Technology Fund) and 26 percent (ROP Asturias), 
while the equivalent range for the ESF was between 6 percent (ROP Castilla La 
Mancha) and 38 percent (ROP Castilla y Leon). 
Similar diversity was evident in relation to ERDF earmarked expenditure:  
x In Finland, the 75 percent target had been achieved by some individual 
programmes (e.g. Itä-Suomi OP, and also the national ESF OP, where the respective 
figure is 96.2 percent), but proved to be more challenging in the Etelä- and Pohjois-
Suomi OPs. More generally, performance has been relatively slow in measures to 
support innovation, networking and knowledge structures, when compared to the 
promotion of business activities and interventions aiming to improve regional 
accessibility and operational environments. 
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x In Greece, the share of earmarked spending is higher than higher than the ex-ante 
target, but spending is very low and the relatively high of earmarked projects 
committed corresponded to just two categories (‘advanced support services to 
firms and groups of firms’, and ‘other investment in firms’) rather than balanced 
progress across all of the Lisbon categories. Among the key intervention funded by 
these categories are the ‘Credit Guarantee Fund for Small and Micro Enterprises’ 
(TEMPME SA) and support for female and youth entrepreneurship. 
x In Austria, private sector R&D measures were reported as being considerably 
behind the average performance. Moreover, the report highlighted a tendency for 
beneficiaries to apply to domestic programmes for funding instead due to the lower 
administrative burden, thus it remains to be seen whether the ambitious ex-ante 
Lisbon targets will be achieved.  
x A similar situation can be seen in Spain where R&TD assistance for firms under the 
NOP Technology Fund is strikingly low, contrasting with the strong performance in 
the NOP Knowledge–Based Economy which mainly funds RTD in public research 
centres. 
As regards the relative performance of the different funds, most countries reported 
stronger spending under the ERDF, although this was not always the case (e.g. Denmark, 
Finland, France, Netherland, Portugal and Spain). 
x In Portugal, commitments and spending under the ESF were particularly high by EU 
standards. The so-called New Opportunities Initiative has been the main driver, 
facilitated by a strong political commitment to the initiative and the fact that it 
had already been launched in the latter stages of the previous programme period.  
x The Austrian report highlighted the case of the ROP Burgenland (Phasing Out), 
which had committed 85 percent of funding to labour market integration and social 
inclusion measures. As with Portugal, the main reason for this positive performance 
was the well-established nature of these activities, embedded within the support 
offered by the Public Employment Service. 
Lastly, a relatively strong performance was reported for the Cohesion Fund in several EU12 
Member States, as in Hungary and the Czech Republic, where the Cohesion Fund supports 
large infrastructure projects accounting for major shares of funding in transport and 
environmental domains, including on (earmarked) TEN-T networks.  
3.3.2 Outputs and results 
Reporting on outputs and results was patchy, with many reports not providing any 
quantitative information or qualitative assessment. The Commission requested data for 
core indicator achievements at national level, but this was only transmitted to the 
Commission by half of the Member States. It was therefore not possible to provide an 
aggregate picture of performance, as reflected in the partial insights contained in the 
Commission’s Strategic Report (see Box 4). The limited reporting of monitoring data is, 
however, not surprising given the early stage in the programme period and the limited 
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progress on which to report in many countries. A more thorough assessment is expected in 
the 2012 reports. 
Box 4: Outputs and results reported in the Commissions Strategic Report 
 
The Commission’s Strategic Report provides data on two indicators at EU level. 
 
1. Gross jobs: ‘targets’ of 351,300 gross jobs in 13 Member States (AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, FI, HU, IE, LU, 
NL, PL, SE, SI), while eight countries report the creation of 55,900 gross jobs (CZ, DE, FI, IE, PL, SE, 
SI). 
 
2. Number of people supported: The ESF has reached six million people (52 percent women). A third 
of beneficiaries are unemployed (7 percent long-term unemployed), and vulnerable groups represent 
13 percent. 
 
With respect to the CSG and thematic priorities, the following outputs and results are reported.  
 
1. Attractive places to invest and work 
Transport: In Slovenia, new roads developed along a TEN corridor achieving a total reduction of 
journey time equal to €21 million. 
 
Broadband infrastructures: In Ireland, 34,764 additional users provided with broadband coverage by 
the end of 2009, representing 31 percent of the overall target. 
 
2. Improving knowledge and innovation for growth 
Entrepreneurship: In Germany, 1,126 materialised projects in support of SMEs, whereas the 
aggregated supported target 26,493 out of which 2,224 has been achieved.  
 
ICT applications: Four (unidentified) Member States) reported 2,546 information society-related 
projects being committed. 
 
3. More and better jobs: No examples given (but see the above indicators on jobs and beneficiaries). 
 
4. The territorial dimension 
Urban development: In Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal, 1,696 urban development projects 
were committed, while Bulgaria, Estonia and Luxembourg implemented 133 projects.  
 
Tourism: Hungary and Poland report the commitment of 539 projects; Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia 
have implemented 92 projects. 
 
 
The reporting of evaluation findings was limited for similar reasons. While the Commission 
noted that lessons from national and regional evaluations were mentioned in 20 national 
reports, most only gave an indication of the evaluations underway or planned, or presented 
general findings relating to the previous round of programmes. Where evaluation results of 
this period were reported, they related primarily to operational issues (e.g. France, 
Hungary, Portugal), although some preliminary and general insights on the achievements of 
strategic objectives were provided in the Portuguese case (Box 5). This also holds true for 
EU-wide evaluations undertaken for the Commission. The main findings highlighted in the 
Commission’s report were drawn from the 2000-06 ex post evaluations and one study of the 
present period,17 an ex ante evaluation of the ‘potential’ of the programmes to contribute 
to Lisbon and sustainable development goals rather than achievements in practice.  
                                                 
17 Nordregio (2009) Op. Cit.  
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Box 5: Evaluation of strategic objectives in Portugal  
 
The Portuguese Strategic Report outlines some preliminary NSRF evaluation findings on actual and 
expected outcomes, structured according to the three overarching strategic priorities (so-called 
‘thematic agendas’) guiding the NSRF. 
 
1. Human Potential Agenda: a clear commitment to improvement of the employability of workers, 
youth and adults is evident within the framework of the ‘New Opportunities Initiative’. Improving 
human capital constitutes the main link to the CSG, but the actual impact on employment will depend 
on increase demand for skills form. For this to occur it is essential that the interventions supported 
under the agenda boost the demand for the most needed skills. 
 
2. Factors of Competitiveness Agenda: of particular relevance is the support for facilitating 
innovation and entrepreneurship. The interventions are contributing to the ability of all territories to 
compete more effectively, to the recovery, and to the expansion of territorially-based 
competitiveness. The consolidation of ‘regional innovation systems’ is a critical factor for the 
development of interventions under this agenda, closely connected to the skills upgrading priorities 
which are required by the business community. 
 
3. Territorial Enhancement Agenda: contributes to the ’attractiveness’ dimension of the CSG, but 
has progressed at a slower pace reflecting the diversity of the interventions supported, the 
fragmentation of the agenda under the NSRF, the lower levels of commitments and spending in key 
areas, particularly in terms of (large) national projects in transport and in the field of urban water 
interventions. In this context, the contribution of the Cities POLIS XXI programme is underlined, while 
also acknowledging the challenges in creating a genuinely cross-cutting shift in paradigm capable of 
integrating and coordinating the different sectoral logics which permeate the agenda. 
 
 
3.3.3 Factors affect ing performance  
Despite the limited availability of data or evaluation evidence on achievements, the reports 
generally presented a positive picture of performance and of the outlook for the rest of the 
period. Nevertheless, as underlined in the Commission’s report, several ‘systemic 
obstacles’ to speedy implementation were reported.  
x EU-level delays on agreeing the EU budget, the regulatory framework and 
programme negotiations that slowed down the launch of the programmes (e.g. 
Austria, Germany, Spain, Lithuania);  
x changes in the rules on financial control, notably the additional demands 
associated with the compliance assessment exercise (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovakia, United Kingdom);  
x complexity of managing overlapping programming periods (Austria, Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, United Kingdom), 
compounded by the widespread use of the extended closure provisions;  
x domestic governance challenges or weaknesses, notably unclear distribution of 
tasks, insufficient experience, lack of administrative capacity and internal 
reorganisation processes of public administration (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania); 
and 
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x the economic crisis - cited as complicating delivery and changing demands 
(Austria, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom), including 
putting pressures on national or local public financing (Germany, Spain, Finland, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta), although some reported that the programmes had 
started at a similar rhythm to the previous period (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden).  
Additional factors affecting performance of Lisbon-related interventions cited in IQ-Net 
country reports included the following. 
x Restrictive or administratively demanding EU rules: notably for R&D and 
innovation projects, not only because of n+2 demands but also because of eligibility 
or expenditure justification requirements for beneficiaries (Austria, France); and 
in the ICTs field, where Structural Funds rules (and State aid requirements) are 
limiting interventions in the field of broadband infrastructure to so-called ‘white 
zones’ (with no mobile phone or internet connection) and the deployment of high 
speed broadband to industrial estates (i.e. excluding other potential users) 
(France). 
x Ineffective targeting of interventions: The Czech Republic report notes that more 
attention needs to be placed on broader conceptions of innovation for firms 
(marketing, trade, co-operation, management of innovations, etc.), viewed as 
being critical for competitiveness in a global market. It also criticises the excessive 
focus on a ‘linear innovation model’ based on the idea that the results of R&D 
represent basic sources of innovation which are consequently used by companies to 
improve their products and technologies. This holds true only for some types of 
innovation, and even then only partially. 
x The novelty of certain priority themes compared to the 2000-06 period: 
including practical difficulties with setting up financial engineering instruments 
such as JEREMIE (France).  
x The insufficient maturity of RDT and innovation interventions: and their redesign 
following a change of government (Greece).  
x Coordination challenges: among interventions within and across OPs (Czech Rep, 
Poland, Portugal); between national Ministries in relation to ROPs (Greece); and 
between science and enterprise (Czech Republic, Poland). Drawing on a review of 
evaluation studies by the Ministry of Regional Development,18 the Polish report 
notes that the main obstacle for increasing the competitiveness of the economy is 
the low level of awareness (particularly among SMEs) about opportunities and gains 
                                                 
18 Rekomendacje dla krajowych polityk publicznych majĎcych wpãyw na efektywnoħĄ i skutecznoħĄ 
realizacji polityki spójnoħci [Recommendations for the national public policies that have an influence 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of Cohesion Policy implementation], a document developed by the 
Department for Coordination of Infrastructural Programmes of the MRD on the basis of evaluations, 
Warsaw 2009. 
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that can flow from innovation and cooperation between science and the business 
sector.  
Box 6: Performance-based management of Intermediate Bodies in Hungary 
 
 
An evaluation of the of the NSRF Intermediate Bodies’ management model was undertaken in the 
latter half of 2009. Commissioned by the National Development Agency, the objective was to assess 
experiences with the performance-based financing system of ‘service level agreements’ and to make 
recommendations on how to better encourage the bodies to perform their tasks faster. The NDA aims 
to utilise the results of the study to establish new contracts underpinned by a unified system of basic 
principles, financing logic and structure. The main conclusion of the evaluation is that the current 
model is not optimal, but that it has clearly enabled a substantial improvement of the performance 
orientation of NSRF institutions and enabled the creation of a simple accounting system. The major 
deficiencies of the system are as follows. 
 
 The agreements do not identify the content of the required service with sufficient precision and do 
not define clear and comprehensive quality requirements. 
 
 The fee structure often does not reflect the quality of management and does not enable in all cases 
comparison of the remuneration of IBs, which hinders the client from making a clear comparison of 
results and costs. 
 
 The flat-rate charge applied in the agreement does not reflect differences between the various 
schemes and the unified fee structure and flat-rate fees do not reflect differences between IBs. As a 
result, financing does not adequately reflect expenditure and a financial management related risk 
arises. 
 
 IBs are not encouraged to perform their tasks faster than is necessary. 
 
 The Managing Authorities do not possess the management capacity required by the SLAs although 
substantial management systems and supervising staff should be assigned when such amounts are 
paid. 
 
The evaluators do not consider there to be a realistic, radical alternative to the current model, but 
do recommend future revisions to place more emphasis on output-oriented performance as opposed 
to rules-based compliance. 
 
 
x Administrative capacity weaknesses: lack of staff, high turnover in implementing 
structures and the delayed approval of domestic laws on civil servants were noted 
in the Czech Republic report. 
x Managing performance: weaknesses have been identified in the Hungarian model 
for managing Intermediate Bodies’ performance on the basis of an evaluation (Box 
6). 
3.3.4 Measures taken to overcome difficult ies  
In reviewing the measures employed to overcome any difficulties faced, the Member States 
were encouraged to set out how the measures in the Cohesion Policy Recovery package 
were taken up. Most reports confirmed the continued relevance of the agreed strategies, 
noting that they provide sufficient flexibility to adjust to the changing socio-economic 
context. Among the main crisis response measures used were administrative simplification 
to reduce burdens on beneficiaries, the use of internal flexibility within priorities and the 
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modification in financial allocations between priorities or changes in co-financing rates. 
The additional EU advance payments increased pre-financing and accelerated investments, 
often involving changes in national policy and procedures. In terms of interventions, the 
measures most widely used were ESF labour market activation measures targeted at people 
most affected by the crisis and greater use of financial engineering instruments, while only 
a small number of programmes redirected funding to support new measures targeting 
energy efficiency investment.  
Examples of specific measures cited in IQ-Net country reports to tackle the crisis and/or to 
support effective delivery of objectives include the following. 
x Programme modifications or financial reallocations: In Hungary, several financial 
reallocations among programmes were made in response to the economic crisis 
during 2008: €427 million reallocated from the TOP and SIOP to the EDOP’s Priority 
2 (Complex development of enterprises) augmented by €404 million and Priority 4 
(Financial instruments) by €24 million. These amounts increased the budget of the 
EDOP by 14.5 percent. Reallocations of SOROP’s Priority 2 (Improving adaptability) 
of €77 million were made to Priority 1 (Improving employability, promoting entry to 
the labour market). In Spain, the ERDF ROP Castilla-La Mancha transferred €33 
million from the transport and energy priority to the local and urban development 
priority. Requests were also made under ESF, including: reallocations between 
categories and priorities and the inclusion of new categories of spending (Navarra); 
amendments to selection criteria and co-financing rate under various priorities 
(Valencia); and the ESF ROP Catalonia, proposing to incorporate private co-
financing for certain operations. Re-negotiated intervention rates helped alleviate 
match-funding pressures for project sponsors in Wales too, while award rates were 
raised in the most disadvantaged regions in Hungary. 
Other finance-related measures aimed to ensure a smooth transition to the new period, to 
accelerate spending or to limit delays in payments. 
x Ensuring funding continuity: Recycling of 2000-06 funds and a ‘shadow round’ of 
funding before adoption of the 2007-13 programmes ensured that difficulties 
caused by adoption delays were minimised (Scotland).  
x Advance payments: In Portugal, advances were targeted at municipalities 
implementing school infrastructure modernisation projects and for firms under the 
incentive schemes. In an effort to help ease the liquidity problems of the 
beneficiaries, Hungary raised the upper limit of the advance payment to 40 
percent, simplified the disbursement procedure and extended the deadline for 
accounting for the use of the advance.  
x New financial instruments: The approval of JEREMIE funds has helped deliver 
support quickly (Spain, Wales).  
x Front-loading programme spending: was one of the main measures used in 
Scotland to tackle the crisis difficulties, notably by speeding up project approval.  
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x Sanctions for late payment: Default interest on late payments has been introduced 
for the cases where the administration organisation fails to meet the scheduled 
payment deadlines for reasons within its control (Hungary).  
A wide range of measures were introduced to lighten the administrative load for 
beneficiaries or to relax funding conditions  
x Simplification of project administration and beneficiary procedures: The 
disbursement process has been accelerated by the increased of the value limit of 
exemption from submitting authenticated invoice copies for large projects 
(Hungary). In Poland, the complex procedures and requirements for recipients 
applying for EU funds are being addressed through the appointment of a ‘Team for 
simplification of the EU funds implementation system’. Simplification of 
administrative capacity certification processes: In Greece, the 2nd stage of 
administrative capacity certification will no longer be compulsory for beneficiaries. 
x Simplification of eligibility conditions: obligations connected with the financial 
guarantees have been eased and certain documents required for the conclusion of 
the contract and/or submission of the application are now checked only once 
(Hungary). 
x Introduction of flat-rate costs: In France, simplifications via the option to use flat 
rate costs began to take effect at the end of 2009.  
x Clarification of rules: In an effort to protect the fundamental interests of project 
owners in Hungary, certain procedural principles were defined (e.g. regulatory 
compliance requirements, equal treatment, right to fair administration and 
decisions taken on time, good faith and cost efficiency). 
x Accelerated and simplified project selection process: notably for major transport 
projects (Hungary). 
Other measures for beneficiaries aimed to raise awareness of funding opportunities and to 
offer administrative and project development support.  
x Information events and workshops were held for stakeholders to encourage 
applications (England), while broader packages of solutions were introduced in the 
Czech Republic and Poland, including beneficiary training and assistance in the 
process of projects preparation.  
Close monitoring and follow-up of projects has necessarily in many IQ-Net 
countries/regions, two noteworthy examples including: 
x Monitoring and review: In France, A monitoring group is in place for the NSRF, 
composed of four thematic teams (innovation, ICT, sustainable development, urban 
development). The teams have examined implementation challenges and have 
developed recommendations in order to improve programming and the OPs’ 
contribution to NSRF and EU targets.  
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x More systematic IT systems: In Poland, a number of efforts to prepare applications 
better and accelerate the implementation of large projects were undertaken by 
introducing a uniform management and monitoring system of key projects. 
Lastly, broader domestic changes in governance arrangements or budgeting priorities have 
supported the delivery of goals. 
x Closer alignment of domestic budgets with Lisbon themes: The Finnish report 
notes that the Lisbon-focusing is expected to improve as a result of the 2010 budget 
proposal, which ties the regional OPs closer the objectives of the National Reform 
Programme. Future budget priorities are expected to focus strongly on 
entrepreneurship, new business and job creation in the creative industry, R&D and 
innovation, and employment and education measures.  
x Ministerial restructuring: In Greece, the Strategic Report notes that changes in 
Ministerial structures and responsibilities, involving the merger and redistribution of 
competences, have had a positive impact improving coordination and securing 
effective implementation of the NSRF. 
3.3.5 Improving programme performance  
As discussed above, the NSRF and programme strategies are largely regarded as being 
coherent with the evolving socio-economic context and with core objectives. Many reports 
did not outline any recommendations for improving performance in the years ahead, 
beyond the need to accelerate the overall implementation of the NSRF and programmes. 
From this perspective, the main goal for the future is one of maintaining rather than 
changing strategic focus. Strategic modifications are not always ruled out, however. For 
instance, some reports underlined that revisions will be considered when the strategic and 
operational evaluations are completed at the mid-term stage (Greece, Poland) or in 
exceptional cases where there are risks of funds not being absorbed (Czech Republic). In 
addition, some of the reports suggest that adjustments to specific aspects of the strategies 
or of operational arrangements could help to ensure that existing aims are met. 
x More effective coordination: with national development strategies and policies 
(Finland), including with the NRP (Poland); across programmes or thematic 
priorities (Czech Republic, Portugal); and across different Funds (Finland, 
Poland). 
x Support for beneficiaries: particularly for measures with low capacity to spend and 
to deliver on objectives, through counselling, consultancy and training (Czech 
Republic). 
x Greater territorial differentiation in the targeting of programmes: to reflect 
specific regional needs in NOPs or ROPs (Hungary, Portugal). 
x More effective and selective project appraisal and selection: in relation to 
programme and NSRF objectives (Czech Republic, Portugal), particularly regarding 
innovation interventions (France).  
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x Embedding monitoring systems to supporting strategic and operational 
management: by achieving genuine interoperability between Managing Authority 
information systems and coordination bodies (Portugal).  
x Administrative simplification: by reducing EU or domestic regulatory complexity 
(Austria, Finland, Poland) and reviewing the Commission’s role in the audit and 
control of projects (Poland). 
The Commission’s Strategic Report did not set out detailed lessons or recommendations to 
inform the remainder of the period. Its main concerns were that implementation in priority 
areas facing delays (the rail sector, certain energy and environmental investments, 
investment in the area of the digital economy, social inclusion, and governance and 
capacity building) is speeded up, and to ensure that the next round of reports focus more 
on outputs, results and strategic developments on the basis of accurate and complete data. 
More recently, however, the Commission has set out a range of recommendation to support 
smart growth within the framework of Europe 2020 (see Box 7).19
                                                 
19 European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Regional 
Policy Contributing To Smart Growth In Europe 2020, SEC(2010) 1183, Brussels. 
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Box 7: Commission recommendations to supporting smart growth  
 
Member State Actions 
 
1. Developing smart specialisation strategies: drawing on support for technical assistance and 
subjecting them to international peer review. The action should be accompanied by two flanking 
measures: 1) reinforce ERDF support for education, research and innovation in the current period, 
including by drawing on complementary funding from FP7 and CIP. The framework conditions for 
research and innovation and a knowledge-based economy should be improved by aligning ERDF 
support with the National Reform Programme priorities (linked to Guideline 4 of IEEPG) 2) make full 
use of the flexibility to redirect funding to this end in OPs.  
 
2. Making more extensive use of financial engineering instruments in support of innovation: The 
expansion of lending and equity financing for innovation through existing instruments, including the 
EIB group, and particularly to SMEs should be a policy priority. 
 
3. Pursuing the possibility to finance interregional cooperation to promote research and 
innovation and better access to international research and innovation networks under FP7 and 
CIP. 
 
4. Ensuring coherence between supply push and demand pull research and innovation policy, by 
making use of the opportunities offered by public procurement co-financed by the ERDF to increase 
the innovation content of products, processes and services. 
 
5. Using international peer review by independent experts for research projects more 
systematically to enhance the effectiveness of support.  
 
6. Considering the use of the ERDF for financing suitable shortlisted FP7 and CIP projects. 
 
7. Exploiting the possibilities for improving regional innovation policy through peer learning: 
offered by FP7, CIP and INTERREG IV C platforms and networks.  
 
European Commission Actions 
 
1. Facilitate the design and implementation of smart specialisation strategies by developing (a) a 
’Smart Specialisation Platform’ before 2012 to help identify needs, strengths and opportunities (b) 
data, policy analysis and information on research and innovation performance and specialisation from 
an EU-wide perspective (c) platforms for mutual learning on the design and implementation of such 
strategies (including the CIP-funded ‘European Cluster Cooperation Forum’ and the European Cluster 
Alliance and the FP7-funded ‘Regions of Knowledge’ and Research Potential projects). 
 
2. Assist implementation of education, research and innovation projects through knowledge 
transfer and diffusion of good practice, with the help of the 'Regions for Economic Change' initiative 
(including 'RegioStars') and by providing technical support to innovation-based Fast Track regional 
networks as well as to interregional collaboration supported e.g. under INTERREG IVC, Regions of 
Knowledge and CIP-funded cluster activities. 
 
3. Work closely with financial institutions to leverage funding and maximise the use of existing 
financial instruments, including by establishing a RSFF window/facility for Convergence regions, 
more intensive use of JEREMIE, as well as by examining ways of extending the scope of existing 
financial engineering instruments to new research and innovation activities. 
 
4. Facilitate business opportunities for SMEs' through consolidating and reinforcing the Enterprise 
Europe Network (EEN), the partners of which should, in turn, help organisations to make better use 
of ERDF financing for innovation. 
 
5. Improve the coherence and complementarity of EU policies for education, research and 
innovation, with the aim of: identifying and promoting the take-up of examples of good practice for 
policymakers and innovation support providers; expanding and upgrading the 'Practical Guide on EU 
funding opportunities' in this area and establishing a single web-based portal on Commission support 
for research and innovation, linked to, or included in, the FP7 Participant Portal to facilitate access 
of innovating bodies to EU funding. 
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4. LISBON AND THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMES  
4.1 Financial implementation  
According to Article 67 of Regulation 1083/2006, the Annual Implementation Reports need 
to provide information on financial progress with the programmes. However, in the case of 
their contribution to the various priority themes, it is not specified whether this refers to 
actual payments or only to commitments. Hence, while some Managing Authorities give 
information on actual payments, others only provide commitment data. Payment data are 
more useful for analysing financial progress. This is partly because committed funding can 
still be withdrawn or decommitted if not used after two (or three) years. Further, 
‘commitment’ can mean different degrees of financial implementation of funds. Therefore, 
as a COCOF information note pointed out in 2009, “Member States are encouraged to use a 
common national definition of the concept operations selected to be used 
consistently”20. 
4.1.1 Earmarked allocation vs. earmarked financial implementation 
The starting point for the analysis is to consider how earmarked spending is proceeding at 
the level of selected IQ-Net programmes for which data are available. Figure 7 shows a 
comparison between initial programme allocation to earmarked categories and funds 
committed to earmarked categories by the end of 2009, while Figure 8 does so for those 
programmes where payment data were available. 
As might be expected, the RCE programmes set out some of the highest earmarking targets 
at the start of the programme period.  
x Among regional programmes, the Austrian programmes (Steiermark: 92.6 percent; 
Niederösterreich: 86.4 percent), Denmark (83.3 percent), Prague (Competitiveness 
OP: 96.5 percent; Adaptability OP: 76.2) and Länsi-Suomi (81.1 percent) have the 
most ambitious targets. But also some sectoral programmes specifically aimed at 
Lisbon objectives have high earmarked allocations: the Czech Enterprises and 
Innovations OP has the highest earmarked allocation (95.3 percent) of all IQ-Net 
programmes and the Portuguese Competitiveness OP earmarked 87.9 percent of its 
funds to Lisbon priority themes. Both programmes are also implemented in 
Convergence regions. 
x Earmarking is voluntary for the EU12, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia in the case of IQ-Net programmes. About half of the programmes have 
committed a higher share to earmarked categories, while the other half committed 
more to non-earmarked categories. Differences to initial allocation are usually not 
very big. Yet, in Poland and Hungary, where earmarked allocation is comparatively 
low, implementation of earmarked funds seems to be more challenging. 
                                                 
20 European Commission (2010) Working document prepared by the Coordination Committee of the 
Funds (COCOF), COCOF 09/0008/02-EN, p. 3. Available at: http://www.interact-
eu.net/downloads/2001/COCOF_Document_on_reporting_of_categorisation_data_under_article_11_of
_Regulation_EC_No_1828_2006.pdf 
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Figure 7: Share of earmarked allocation compared to earmarked commitment in 
selected IQ-Net programmes, % 
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Source: Operational Programmes and Annual Implementation Reports 2009; *data sourced from Greek 
Strategic Report 2009 
Figure 8: Share of earmarked allocation compared to earmarked payment in selected 
IQ-Net programmes, % 
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Source: Operational Programmes and Annual Implementation Reports 2009 
Looking at payments only (Figure 8), all but one of the ten analysed programmes exceeded 
their initial Lisbon-target at the end of 2009. Differences between earmarked and non-
earmarked progress may also result from the fact that the Lisbon share is very high in many 
cases. This means that often the non-earmarked allocation is concentrated in just a few 
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measures. If these are scheduled to be realised towards the end of a period, or if they are 
delayed, this has a significant effect on the percentage of earmarked expenditure. For 
instance, in the Portuguese Competitiveness OP, almost 100 percent of payments have been 
realised in Lisbon-relevant priority themes; this is also due to the fact that all non-
earmarked funds are concentrated in one priority theme. 
4.1.2 Earmarked vs. non-earmarked financial implementation 
Moving on to the direct comparison of financial progress in earmarked and non-earmarked 
categories (Figure 9 and Figure 10), there is no common trend in commitments. In some 
cases, Lisbon-measures perform better (e.g. Lowlands and Uplands Scotland, 
Niederösterreich), while in others the non-earmarked themes perform better (e.g. Hungary, 
Norra Mellansverige). Excluding those programmes where funds have only been committed 
to Lisbon priority themes, 11 out of 20 cases have higher commitments in non-earmarked 
categories.  
However, when it comes to actual payments, Figure 10 shows that more funds have been 
paid out in earmarked measures. All 11 analysed programmes show higher payment rates in 
Lisbon-measures, and in several cases no payment had yet been made to other measures at 
the end of 2009. However, as Denmark pointed out, in some programmes the allocation of 
funds to non-earmarked themes is not of high relevance. Leaving aside funding for 
Technical Assistance, examples for very low allocation to non-Lisbon themes are the 
Portuguese Competitiveness OP (9.5 percent) and Steiermark (6.7 percent). 
Figure 9: Commitment of funds in earmarked and non-earmarked priority themes in 
selected IQ-Net programmes, compared to programme allocation, % 
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Source: Operational Programmes and Annual Implementation Reports 2009 
Notes: Without Technical Assistance; *No allocation of funds to non-earmarked priority themes;  
**data sourced from Greek Strategic Report 2009 
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Nevertheless, the overall picture shows that most programmes are more or less in line 
with their expectations. Although twelve out of 18 programmes remain behind their 
targets (see Figure 7 and Figure 8), the majority of them are still very close to their goals. 
Where there are slight differences between the two groups of priority themes, as Länsi-
Suomi and Slovenia pointed out, these differences are usually not an issue of concern and 
financial implementation is progressing as planned. A closer look is now taken at how the 
various IQ-Net programmes performed from the viewpoint of Lisbon-earmarked themes. 
Figure 10: Payment of funds in earmarked and non-earmarked priority in selected IQ-
Net programmes, compared to programme allocation, % 
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Source: Operational Programmes and Annual Implementation Reports 2009 
Notes: Without Technical Assistance; *No allocation of funds to non-earmarked priority themes 
 
Programmes with earmarked categories performing better than the average include 
Aquitaine, Czech Enterprises and Innovations OP, Lombardia, Niederösterreich, País Vasco, 
Portuguese OPs, Sachsen-Anhalt, and the Scottish Lowlands and Uplands OP): 
x In Aquitaine, payments had mainly been made under the Lisbon-relevant Priorities 1 
and 2, focussing on knowledge economy and ICT. 
x The sectoral Czech OP Enterprises and Innovations allocated over 95 percent of its 
funding to Lisbon-related themes. All payments have been realised in these, as 
because of State aid issues, no spending has yet been realised in the only non-
earmarked priority theme (50 ‘Rehabilitation of industrial sites’). The Enterprises 
and Innovations OP has been the most strongly affected programme in the Czech 
Republic. Because of the crisis, 181 projects had to be abandoned before their start 
since 2008. In addition, several projects had to be abandoned during realisation. 
Some beneficiaries cannot guarantee the continuation of projects during the crisis 
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and hence have preferred to abandon the project. The Managing Authority 
therefore introduced an option that a project can be continued by the successor of 
a company in the case of failure. In the Prague Competitiveness OP, payments are 
comparatively high at 10.7 percent. According to the Managing Authority, this is 
also due to the relatively small allocation compared with other regions. Differences 
between earmarked and non-earmarked categories are small; yet, there are major 
differences at the level of priority themes. Some themes perform very well, e.g. 
R&TD activities, entrepreneurship and promotion of clean transport. Others lag 
behind, e.g. social inclusion, developing human potential in R&D and assistance to 
R&TD, particularly in SME and ICT. 
x In Lombardia, payments have so far only been realised in earmarked categories. 
Three Priorities of the programme are predominantly earmarked: ‘Innovation and 
Knowledge Economy’, ‘Energy’ and ‘Sustainable mobility’. Especially the first 
Priority, which is focusing on the support of the innovation within firms and where 
about half of the programme’s resources are allocated, is performing well thanks to 
the commitment of the Lombardia business sector to innovation and research. 
x In Austria, the earmarked allocation is generally comparatively high, and 
Niederösterreich even exceeds its target of 86.4 percent by more than eight 
percentage points. Yet, the reason is that commitment has been low in non-
earmarked categories; particularly in the area of flood prevention no commitments 
could yet been made. 
x For Sachsen-Anhalt, it has been difficult to assess the reasons for differences in the 
financial progress of Lisbon versus non-Lisbon interventions because of the 
complexity of the programme and the fact that the Lisbon codes were applied to 
Sub-/Actions ex post, rather than being used to structure the programmes. This 
means that different Sub-/Actions with the same code are included in different 
parts of the programmes. Instead, it is planned that the mid-term evaluation of 
2010-11 will assess the extent to which the programmes are contributing to the 
Lisbon agenda and the extent to which there is a need for re-programming (see 
Section 4.5.2). 
x In the País Vasco, most earmarked categories have performed better than others. 
Spending was above the average in priority themes such as ‘R&D and innovation 
activities’ (20 percent), ‘Other investment in firms’ (15.4 percent) and ‘Services 
and applications for citizens’ (14.4 percent). By contrast, the earmarked category 
‘Promotion of clean urban transport’ has yet to certify any expenditure. 
Performance is similar in the region’s sub-programme in Bizkaia, where earmarked 
expenditure is higher (10 percent) than other expenditure (4 percent). Most of this 
is accounted by an e-government project for citizens under the information society 
theme.  
x In Portugal, the latest data reveals that some 85 percent of spending was 
earmarked to Lisbon categories of expenditure (as at September 2010). The key 
reason for the positive performance is that priority has been placed on earmarked 
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areas of intervention under the ERDF, particularly the business aid schemes under 
the competitiveness agenda. Moreover, as noted earlier, the ESF-funded ‘New 
Opportunities Initiative’ has been a particular priority during the crisis and had 
already been launched in the latter stages of the previous period enabling a smooth 
launch from the outset. 
x The good performance in Lisbon terms in the Scottish Lowlands and Uplands OP is 
mainly due to Priorities 1 ‘Research and innovation’ and 2 ‘Enterprise growth’, 
which are key to Lisbon objectives. Priorities 3 ‘Urban regeneration’ and 4 ‘Rural 
development’, which also partly contribute to Lisbon categories, have experienced 
lower levels of interest.  
Programmes where earmarked categories have been under-performing are Alsace, 
Hungary, Länsi-Suomi, Nordrhein-Westfalen, ĦlĎskie, Steiermark, Vlaanderen. 
x In Alsace, commitment figures for non-earmarked measures are performing better 
than earmarked ones. The earmarking rate dropped in 2009 due to a large non-
earmarked project in urban transport, although a reasonable number of projects 
were developed in the fields of innovation and energy issues in 2009.  
x In Hungary, in the regional OPs Dél-Dunántúl and Nyugat-Dunántúl, earmarked 
spending occurred only in the priority themes 3 ‘Technology transfer’ and 5 
‘Advanced support services for firms’. However, less than 30 percent of funds are 
earmarked in these two programmes. 
x In Länsi-Suomi, progress in earmarked categories is only slightly behind the target. 
In the course of the programme period, the situation with regard to the earmarking 
categories has improved, partly as a result of the improved knowledge of the 
relevant authorities with respect to project generation and management.  
x In Nordrhein-Westfalen, the relatively low commitment levels under certain 
components of Priorities 1 and 2, where much of the Lisbon spending is 
concentrated relate to a number of reasons: preparatory work for the competitive 
calls of Priority 2 took a long time; a crisis-related fall in demand for investment 
loans from the financial engineering instrument; delays in the body responsible for 
design and implementation of an instrument aimed at technology-oriented start-
ups; and changes to a domestic Land programme supposed to co-finance the 
programme. There have also been higher than expected commitments under 
Priority 3, which focuses on regional and urban development and is less Lisbon-
oriented, meaning that the earmarked share of commitments decreased. However, 
it was anticipated that further commitments under Priority 2’s innovation-oriented 
competitive calls would lead to strong rises in the percentage of Lisbon relevant 
commitments. 
x In the ĦlĎskie ROP, the earmarked categories are lagging behind. There are several 
reasons for this. First, delayed domestic legislation regulations on State aid in the 
area of energy, telecommunication infrastructure and R&D infrastructure led to the 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre 38
Taking Stock of Programme Progress:  
Implementation of the Lisbon Agenda and Lessons for Europe 2020 
postponement of calls for proposals and a block on funding under some categories. 
Second, many projects funded by the 45 percent of allocation for key projects and 
sub-regional projects had to be postponed. Finally, the economic crisis caused 
decreases of tax incomes in the beneficiaries’ budgets and some of them had to 
restrict investments, including in ROP projects. Beneficiaries facing financial 
problems tended to give up on projects that were less urgent for local 
communities, and this included some Lisbon-type interventions. In response, the 
Managing Authority proposed a reallocation of resources for loans and guarantee 
funds under a sub-measure in Priority 1 ‘RTDI and entrepreneurship’. 
x In Steiermark, as in Niederösterreich (see above), the non-earmarked allocation is 
very high (92.6 percent). Although the earmarked commitment is also high, the 
figure of 90.7 percent is still slightly behind the target. One reason is that there are 
challenges with the main Intermediate Bodies for R&D interventions (see Section 
4.3.3). 
x In Vlaanderen, the non-earmarked commitment is still performing better, but 
recent changes to the ERDF programme are expected to change this. The financial 
allocation to the four Priorities has been shifted. Initially, each of the Priorities 1 
‘Knowledge economy and innovation’, 2 ‘Entrepreneurship’, 3 ‘Spatial-economic 
environment’ and 4 ‘Urban development’ received 25 percent of the funds. Funds 
have been shifted to Priority 3, where demand had been underestimated. In 
Priorities 1 and 2, initially not eligible investment in infrastructure was made 
eligible. This affected also the distribution of earmarked funds. 
4.2 Outputs and results 
Along with financial implementation progress, Managing Authorities are required to report 
on outputs and results achievements in their Annual Implementation Reports at the level of 
priority axes.21 In order to make outputs and results more comparable between 
programmes and Member States, the Commission published methodological guidance on 
core indicators in June 2009.22 It was a reaction to the lack of comparative data that could 
be drawn from the first Annual Implementation Reports for the year 2007. The document 
defines a set of 41 suggested core indicators for ERDF and Cohesion Fund programmes. 
Many IQ-Net programmes use core indicators in their Annual Implementation Reports, 
but only some specify them as such (e.g. Portugal, Sachsen-Anhalt, Spain, Vlaanderen). 
Vlaanderen, for instance, provides a separate assessment of eight selected core indicators, 
e.g. ‘Gross direct jobs created’ and ‘Number of RTD projects’. The Portuguese NOP 
Competitiveness reports on a mix of core and domestic indicators: Programme indicators 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed review of key trends at the start of this period see Polverari L, Mendez C, Gross 
F, Bachtler J (2007) Making Sense of European Cohesion Policy: 2007-13 On-going Evaluation and 
Monitoring Arrangements, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 21(2), European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
 
22 Indicative guidelines on evaluation methods: Reporting on core indicators for the European Regional 
Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/2007/working/wd7_indicators_en.pdf 
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(by Priority axis); core indicators (OP-level, no targets); and national common indicators 
(no targets). However, most IQ-Net programmes use a domestically defined indicator set. 
While these are often defined at programme level, a common indicator set has been 
developed at the national level in some cases, including indicators linked explicitly to the 
Lisbon strategy (e.g. Czech Republic, France, Spain, Portugal).  
IQ-Net programmes use a wide range of indicators to measure outputs and results. 
Prominent examples in key Lisbon-related thematic priorities include: 
x RDT, innovation and entrepreneurship: the most frequently used indicators are 
number of RTD projects or firms assisted, although there is also a strong interest in 
capturing the dynamics of innovation systems and clusters, i.e. number of 
cooperation projects between universities and businesses (e.g. Norra Mellansverige, 
Portugal NOP Competitiveness).  
x Education: e.g. Sachsen-Anhalt looks at the number of education projects, while 
the ‘Number of Bologna-conform curricula newly developed’ is monitored in the 
Hungarian Social Renewal OP. 
x ICTs: the ‘Length of internet broadband network’ in ĦlĎskie. 
x Renewable energy: In Norra Mellansverige, there is an indicator monitoring the 
number of projects which aim to develop or increase the use of renewable energy.  
x Area habilitated: One of the core indicators proposed by the Commission, it is 
used, for instance, by Vlaanderen. 
x Climate impact: In France, there are CO2 indicators, which partly relate more 
specifically to rational energy usage and renewable energies. Similarly, in 
Niederösterreich there is an indicator for CO2 reduction. 
Some of the applied indicators start from a baseline defined at programme start and others 
are shares, which do not have a baseline value. To take one example, Länsi-Suomi reports 
on four indicators with a baseline, namely: number of new businesses; number of new jobs; 
share of R&D projects; and number of new R&D jobs. In addition, the programme is 
monitored through three indicators without baselines: share of Lisbon-related projects; 
share of equality projects; and share of environmentally-positive projects.  
In terms of reporting, most programmes use overall targets for the whole programme 
period (e.g. Lombardia, Niederösterreich, Sachsen-Anhalt, Slovenian ERDF OP, Steiermark). 
Some programmes developed annual targets by assigning shares of the target to each year 
(e.g. Alsace, Nordrhein-Westfalen). The Portuguese Competitiveness NOP, ĦlĎskie and the 
Spanish programmes have set targets for 2010 and 2013 instead. As required by the 
Regulations, outputs and results are usually reported at Priority level. This makes their 
assessment in relation to earmarked priority themes difficult.  
There has been some criticism about the approach to the measurement of Lisbon-related 
programme progress. According to Norra Mellansverige, current indicators cannot capture 
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Lisbon-related activity appropriately. Better Lisbon-related indicators would be 
appreciated, since the current ones are sometimes considered to be rather generic (Czech 
Republic). However, several Managing Authorities pointed out that there are already too 
many indicators, and that adding more would make monitoring and reporting more 
complex and of less value from a management perspective.  
Many of the Annual Implementation Reports for 2009 note that that it is too early to report 
on outcomes in relation to outputs and results. The time-lag between the implementation 
of measure and the visibility of outputs and results do not allow a good representation of a 
programme’s achievements according to some Managing Authorities (e.g. Czech Republic), 
particularly regarding innovation interventions (e.g. Sweden). This has been compounded 
by the late start of the programmes and the fallout from the economic crisis. As the 
programme authorities in the United Kingdom reported, outputs and results are only just 
starting to become visible now. Interestingly, they have become visible quicker in 
innovation and entrepreneurship/business Priorities, while climate change, transport and 
energy and business environment priorities are taking longer because of the different types 
of activity undertaken. 
Some programmes found reporting on outputs and results challenging because of data 
issues. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, there have been methodological difficulties because the 
instruments co-financed by the OP do not all collect data annually. In the Hungarian Social 
Renewal OP, gathering indicator data has been challenging due to revisions of the indicator 
system in 2009. A comprehensive review has been felt necessary because some indicators 
were not available at the required frequency and their computation changed frequently. In 
addition to that, there was a lack of connection between indicators and the activities of the 
OP. The review of the indicator system is being implemented in the second half of 2010. 
As a result of these issues, quantitative outputs and results are often behind targets. 
Nevertheless, many programmes report good progress for some indicators, particularly 
on outputs: 
x In the Scottish Lowlands and Uplands OP, most output indicators already exceed 
their initial targets, e.g. ‘Number of new business starts’ (142 percent of target) or 
‘Number of ICT and e-learning facilities supported’ (180 percent). The ‘Number of 
enterprises receiving financial support’ under Priority 2 has even already achieved 
2,154 percent. 
x In the Portuguese Competitiveness OP, especially the Priorities 1 ‘Knowledge and 
technological development’ and Priority 5 ‘Networks and collective actions of 
enterprise development’ reported good results. By the end of 2009, already 75 
percent of the targets in Priority 1 have been achieved, while in Priority 5 the 
indicator for ‘Investment supported in collective efficiency strategies/total 
investment supported’ even far exceed the targets. However, several indicators 
have yet to report any progress (such as ‘Investment in seed capital/total 
investment in risk capital’). 
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x In Länsi-Suomi, the physical implementation appears to be comparatively 
advanced. Especially the indicator ‘R&D jobs’ in relation to other more general 
indicators (e.g. new jobs, new businesses) is progressing slightly better. The ‘R&D 
jobs’ target achievement stood at 51.3 percent at the end of 2009, while ‘new 
jobs’ stood at 41.2 percent and ‘new businesses’ at 34.6 percent. 
x Nordrhein-Westfalen reported good results in the number of job creation. While 
the target until the end of 2009 has been set at 8,400-10,800, already 13,000 new 
jobs have been created. 
x The Norra Mellansverige OP, in turn, already exceeded its targets in terms of 
women participating in projects and in the additional access of households and 
firms to broadband. 
x In Alsace, the number of firms involved in collaborative activities is above target. 
Also indicators in the area of renewable energies perform well, considering the 
stage of the programme period. 
x In Vlaanderen, the number of actions to promote knowledge and innovation 
performed well, and also other indicators such as the number of newly started 
companies showed good progress. 
x In the Czech Republic, the ‘Number of projects in the area of renewable energy 
sources’ in the Enterprise and Innovations OP is already well above its target. 
Similarly, also the Prague Competitiveness OP achieved its target in public 
transport interventions, i.e. in terms of new or modernised tram lines. 
x In the ĦlĎskie ERDF OP, while the indicator ‘Extra investment created through 
support’ is in line with its target, performance in other areas is still lagging behind. 
x The Hungarian Social Renewal OP reports good progress in terms of the number of 
persons participating in labour market intervention programmes. Yet, in many other 
indicators the achievement of the set targets appears to be more challenging. 
x The Spanish Knowledge Society OP could already report good results for several 
indicators. An indicator that stands out is the ‘No. clusters/cooperation structures 
created’ which had already achieved ten times its 2013 target by the end of 2009. 
x In Slovenia, the ERDF OP achieved its target, for instance, already for the number 
of supported R&D projects in the private sector. 
x In Austria, the Styrian OP reported good outputs in terms of the number of 
supported projects, while other indicators, such as ‘New jobs in R&D’ showed still 
lower target achievement.  
x Although overall progress in Greece is behind targets, some indicators showed 
satisfying outputs. In Attikí, for instance, 882 SMEs were supported, which 
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corresponds to 74.6 percent of the respective target; in turn, this resulted in the 
creation of 1,268 jobs, 53.3 percent of the target. 
4.3 Factors affecting programme performance  
Since their start in 2007, the performance of programmes across the EU27 has been 
affected by a range of factors. Following the Commission’s Strategic Report, these can be 
broadly divided into EU-related factors (e.g. compliance issues), external factors (the 
economic crisis), and domestic or internal factors (such as lacking administrative capacity 
and experience). It is not always possible to identify which factors specifically hampered 
the implementation of Lisbon-related measures. For instance, the late approval of a 
programme’s management and control system automatically affects all parts of the 
programme. Additionally, the share of earmarked allocation is very high in many Member 
States (e.g. Austria, Denmark, United Kingdom) so that a distinction between Lisbon-
related and other measures is not relevant.  
In spite of various obstacle the programmes are perceived to be progressing well (see 
Section 4.1), and this is confirmed by Figure 11, which illustrates the perceived impact of a 
selection of factors which are potentially influencing the performance of Lisbon-related 
measures. These have been rated by the IQ-Net programme authorities into the categories 
‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’.  
Figure 11: Groups of factors affecting performance of Lisbon measures 
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Source: EPRC research among IQ-Net programme authorities 
Overall, the majority of responses (59 percent) fell into the category ‘low’. Across all 
factors, 27 percent of programme authority responses fell into the category ‘medium’ and 
only 14 percent into ‘high’. The issues with the highest perceived impact, EU-related 
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management and the economic crisis have been rated medium or high only by about half of 
the surveyed programme authorities. At the other end of the scale, general absorption 
issues seem to be less of a concern, with only 29 percent of interviewees selecting the high 
or medium category. This indicates that there is basically high demand for Structural Funds 
co-financing, but that other factors such as the crisis hampered programme 
implementation. 
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Figure 12: Factors affecting the performance of Lisbon measures 
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Source: EPRC research among IQ-Net programme authorities 
When looking at single factors behind the groups of issues shown in Figure 12, a more 
detailed picture becomes visible. The two factors with the most negative impact on the 
implementation of Lisbon measures are related to the administrative time and effort 
required for programme implementation. 39 percent of programme authorities considered 
the parallel management of the 2000-06 (2004-06) and the 2007-13 programme periods to 
have a high effect on the efficient implementation of the current programmes. Related to 
this is the lack of administrative capacity more generally, which ranks second with 30 
percent rating this as being of ‘high’ importance.  
Other factors of concern to programme authorities influencing the implementation of 
Lisbon measures include the economic crisis. Both the crisis-related drop in demand (‘high’ 
and ‘medium’: 60 percent) and the crisis-related lack of co-finance (‘high’ and ‘medium’ 
ranking of 46 percent) have had a considerable impact in the view of many respondents. In 
addition, there is also one major EU-related factor impacting on implementation: the 
delayed approval of management and control systems has been rated into ‘high’ and 
‘medium’ by 53 percent. 
At the other end of the scale, the general demand for funding has not been an issue of high 
importance for any of the interviewees. This confirms the above-noted impression that the 
IQ-Net programmes provide a useful funding source for potential beneficiaries. Three 
domestic factors were rated as having a low impact. Only 24 percent considered domestic 
delays to be hampering Lisbon measures to a significant extent; just one under a third were 
affected by the reorganisation of domestic public administration and internal task 
distribution.  
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The following sections look more closely at the IQ-Net programme authorities’ assessment 
of the various factors and attempt to identify trends. 
4.3.1 Economic crisis 
The economic crisis impacted on all EU Member States, albeit to a different extent. The 
same is the case for Cohesion policy, where programme implementation was affected to 
different degrees and in different ways.23 In some programmes, demand for Cohesion 
policy funding remained stable (e.g. Austrian programmes, Denmark, Lombardia, Sachsen-
Anhalt). One reason for this is, as in Denmark, that programmes are focused on general 
measures rather than on targeting specific groups of beneficiaries. In Sachsen-Anhalt, 
import and export links into the wider international economy are relatively limited 
compared to other parts of Germany and therefore the impact of the crisis has been less 
severe.  
Nevertheless, in other cases, the crisis meant that fulfilling the initial funding allocations 
turned out to be more demanding than expected. In Spain, for instance, the Technological 
Fund OP was agreed in 2005 when the economic climate was more favourable. In that 
context, the Convergence regions are now facing spending challenges in the area of R&D. 
Also in Finland, the economic downturn has particularly affected more innovation and 
learning oriented projects. But, as the Managing Authority for the Italian Research and 
Competitiveness OP pointed out, it is still early to assess the full impact of the crisis. 
The crisis has had major consequences for both private and public sector investment 
decisions in many countries, as indicated by the major differences between commitments 
and spending data. In several countries, the crisis meant that it became more difficult for 
private sector beneficiaries to ensure their co-finance contribution or to carry out approved 
investments projects (e.g. Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Spain), while in 
other cases public bodies are the main beneficiaries of programme funding and have been 
less affected the weak business climate (e.g. Bizkaia, Sweden). Examples of countries or 
programmes reporting difficulties with public co-finance include:  
x Greece: The funding available in Greece as part of the Public Investments 
Programme has been reduced considerably, reinforced by the austerity package 
introduced in 2010.  
x United Kingdom: North East England anticipates match-funding issues for project 
sponsors in the future, given that the major source of match funding – the Single 
Programme – has disappeared with the abolition of the English Regional 
Development Agencies (RDA). Cuts to public budgets are also expected to have a 
major impact on the availability of match funding for all programmes in the United 
Kingdom, particularly in the area of innovation and the higher education sector. 
                                                 
23 See Mendez C and Kah S (2009) Programme Implementation in Times of Economic Crisis: Review of 
Programme Implementation, Winter 2008-Spring 2009, IQ-Net Review Paper 24(1), European Policies 
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow and Kah S (2010) Accelerating Implementation of 
Structural Funds Programmes: Review of Programme Implementation, Summer 2009-Autumn 2009, IQ-
Net Review Paper 25(1), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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x Spain: the already difficult situation with regard to public co-finance is further 
aggravated by occasionally late Commission payments, which require the regions to 
advance funding. However, the province of Bizkaia has not experienced any co-
finance challenges due to its high fiscal autonomy and because the co-finance 
required to match-fund the ERDF is only a small share of the province’s budget.  
In some cases, co-financing difficulties have been particularly acute for local 
authorities:  
x Poland: In ĦlĎskie, municipalities have had to withdraw from some projects, while 
there are still a high number of applications from the private sector.  
x Finland: public co-financing difficulties have mainly affected municipalities 
especially because of the reduction of infrastructure projects which the 
municipalities have traditionally preferred to participate in.  
x Hungary: the need to co-finance projects has led to indebtedness of local 
governments.  
x Portugal: The NSRF’s annual monitoring report for 2009 notes that local authority 
projects (i.e. under the global grants allocated to the ‘Cities Policy’) were affected 
by a range of factors simultaneously, including co-financing challenges arising from 
the impact of the crisis. Indeed, municipality finances have moved from a position 
of surplus in 2006 into deficit in 2007 (-€132m) and rapid deterioration over the 
next two years (-€315m in 2008 and -€1033m in 2009). 
x Nordrhein-Westfalen: challenges with municipal co-finance have arisen, but mainly 
due to structural fiscal problems - relating to the legal agreement on the financing 
of local authorities and the fiscal equalisation mechanism - rather than the crisis. 
Co-finance challenges have been less of an issue in other countries. In Austria, for 
instance, the public bodies involved in Structural Funds will fulfil their funding 
commitments agreed at the start of the programme period. France attributed the 
cushioning effect of Structural Funds partly to the important role of public co-finance. 
Similarly, Finnish authorities pointed out that with the help of national funding the 
situation improved, and EU programmes were able to continue focusing on longer-term 
development.  
The fallout from the crisis should be understood as a dynamic and evolving process. As 
argued in Portugal’s 2009 NSRF monitoring report, it is necessary to take account of the 
sequencing of the crisis to understand the effects on Cohesion policy. The starting point 
was a financial crisis (in banking and some countries’ housing markets) which unleashed 
recessionary effects across the world. Stimulus packages were introduced in most EU 
Member States, with Cohesion policy often playing an important facilitating role. This was 
followed a second round of effects, involving speculative pressures on public budgets and, 
contrary to the first stage, fiscal tightening in many Member States. These public budget 
consolidation efforts, and the debt crises that have erupted in some Member States, have 
led to pressure to national co-finance for Cohesion policy.  
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Despite these effects, financial demand has tended to be in line with expectations in many 
IQ-Net cases.24 In particular, Lombardia and the Czech Republic reported that spending on 
Lisbon themes did not suffer during the crisis (see also Section 4.1). The strategy of the 
Lombardia OP, which is strongly focused on Lisbon-themes, has been reinforced by the fact 
that funding demand from businesses continued to be strong. Also in the Czech Republic, 
there is still strong demand for Structural Funds, since these represent an import funding 
source in the country.  
Delays in Commission approval, both of programmes and of management and control 
systems, have been mentioned as affecting spending by several programme authorities 
(Bizkaia, Länsi-Suomi, Portugal, Vlaanderen). With regard to programme approval, 
authorities in Länsi-Suomi and Vlaanderen noted that delays affected mainly early 
programme stages. In the Hungarian region of Dél-Dunántúl potential beneficiaries could 
prepare for tenders already before official approval. Also in Sweden, programmes and 
specifically Lisbon themes have not been significantly affected by delays. However, Dél-
Dunántúl indicated that the continuous modification of the management and control system 
leads not only to delays but also to problems for the electronic administration system. 
Regarding management and control systems, the approval processes delayed programmes in 
several cases (e.g. Italian Research and Competiveness OP, Länsi-Suomi, Lombardia, Spain). 
In Slovenia, the commitment process started before approval of the system. By contrast, in 
Spain and in Steiermark, many Intermediate Bodies hesitated to spend or commit funds 
while the approval of the management and control system was still outstanding due to legal 
uncertainties. In Lombardia, the gap between approval of the programme and of the 
management and control system has been significant, with repercussions for the 
implementation timetable of the programme, while the approval of the management and 
control system for the Italian Research and Competiveness OP is still outstanding - 
commitments and payments were carried out nonetheless, but this had significant effects 
on the progress of the programme. 
Many management issues are related to the workload involved in compliance with EU 
rules. One of the main reasons for a high workload has been the need to deal with two 
programmes at the same time. Parallel management of two programme periods is one of 
the factors most heavily affecting programme performance (France, Greece, Italian 
Research and Competitiveness OP, ĦlĎskie, Sachsen-Anhalt, Steiermark). In fact, the effect 
of the parallel management of two programme periods has been ranked as being of ‘high’ 
or ‘medium’ importance by about two-thirds of programme authorities interviewed (see 
Figure 11). In Greece, the situation has been exacerbated by the otherwise helpful 
extension of the eligible funding period of the 2000-06 programmes by another year. 
Similarly, the predecessor of the Hungarian Social Renewal OP had been extended, 
prolonging the period of overlap by another year.  
                                                 
24 See also Vironen H (2010) Delivering Structural Funds in Difficult Times: Review of Programme 
Implementation, Summer 2010-Autumn 2010, IQ-Net Review Paper 27(1), European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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The challenges associated with dual programme management can vary considerably 
between different areas of intervention, as in Sachsen-Anhalt where the issues that that 
have arisen relate to: 
x The limited number of staff. Staff working on the funded interventions within the 
Intermediate Bodies faced large work volumes carrying out the final project closure 
checks at of the 2000-06 programme period; this meant that insufficient staff was 
available in the Intermediate Bodies to work on getting the 2007-13 programmes up 
and running, leading to delays. 
x General constraints on the Land budget. These have meant that domestic public 
co-financing for the Structural Funds programmes has been limited, with 
insufficient resources to co-finance both the 2000-06 and 2007-13 periods 
simultaneously. 
x Uneven distribution of demand for funding under different actions in the 
programme.  
4.3.2 Management capacity challenges relat ing to internal factors 
Although clearer and earlier methodological support by the Commission would be 
appreciated, some programme authorities considered that domestic factors have had a 
bigger effect on programme performance (as in the Czech Republic). 
Since the start of the 2007-13 programme period, implementation has been affected by 
new institutional arrangements. For example, in Denmark, new administrative procedures 
were introduced, lengthening administration times and requiring measures to increase 
learning and competence development for administrators at all levels of the programme. In 
Finland, the creation of the new Ministry of Employment and the Economy in 2008 and the 
regional reform project (ALKU) in 2010 led to a reorganisation of responsibilities and tasks 
distribution. In Greece, the division of the country into different Objectives, in combination 
with the mono-fund approach and the increase of the number of bodies involved in the 
implementation has been challenging. In ĦlĎskie, tasks were transferred from the State-
appointed Voivodeship Office the regional government Marshal Office across programming 
periods. The Lisbon measures of the programme were affected especially by the relatively 
late creation of the Silesian Centre of Entrepreneurs in September 2007. In the Czech 
Republic, the inherent features of the domestic implementation system are complex. In 18 
of 26 Czech OPs the Managing Authority is located at the national level. In several other 
programmes or countries internal reorganisation, especially during the programme period, 
influenced programme progress (Greece, Hungary, Italian Research and Competitiveness 
OP, Slovenia).  
Capacity issues have also caused problems. Lack of staff has influenced programme 
performance by several programme authorities (e.g. Italian Research and Competitiveness 
OP, Niederösterreich, ĦlĎskie, Steiermark, Sweden). In Slovenia, this has been further 
aggravated by the high staff turnover. Other capacity issues relate mainly to the complexity 
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of EU rules, especially at the level of Intermediate Bodies (Sachsen-Anhalt) or of 
beneficiaries (Vlaanderen). 
The unclear distribution of programme management tasks is also problematic. The Italian 
Research and Competitiveness OP is managed by two ministries: the Ministry of Economic 
Development is the Managing Authority and the Ministry of Economic Development is an 
Intermediate Body. The development of a common management and control system has 
been difficult, especially given the diversity of the types of interventions included in the 
two distinct parts of the programme. In the case of Sachsen-Anhalt, programme planning 
has been carried out by the State Chancellery, while implementation continues to be a task 
of the Managing Authority. This led to some sub-optimal decision making during the 
programme planning process, which continues to have an effect on programme 
performance.  
Domestic legislation is an issue also for a few IQ-Net programmes (e.g. in ĦlĎskie). In Italy, 
the national document setting out the criteria for eligibility of expenditure was only 
approved in 2008 and this delayed Italian Structural Funds programmes. Also in Nordrhein-
Westfalen one of the main domestic regulations was delayed. The ERDF OP’s RTDI funding is 
mainly channelled through the Land-level Research, Innovation and Technology Programme. 
The Italian Research and Competitiveness OP, the Ministry of Economic Development did 
not have a Minister for six months because of political reasons; hence, the Managing 
Authority lacked direction and it was difficult to take certain decisions without political 
ownership. 
The long preparation and complexity of some projects is a concern for several IQ-Net 
programme authorities (Greece, Sachsen-Anhalt, ĦlĎskie, Vlaanderen, Wales). In Greece, 
significant financial resources in priority themes 17 (railways) and 21 (motorways) are 
allocated to big infrastructure projects which require a long preparation time. Also in 
Vlaanderen, the complexity and duration of a project is a factor that makes 
implementation more challenging. Infrastructure projects have to be planned long in 
advance; urban development projects, for example, take several years to plan. The n+2 
rule constrains the time for implementation even more.  
4.3.3 Factors specific to the type of projects 
The specific character of many Lisbon-related projects has been an important issue in 
several IQ-Net programmes. For instance, a characteristic of RTDI projects is that they are 
commonly located in agglomerations, and hence they are often outside the Convergence 
regions benefiting from the highest levels of support. An example is the Czech Republic, 
where the majority of research and entrepreneurial activity is taking place in Prague, but 
the Czech capital is excluded from funding from both the Enterprises and Innovations OP 
and the Research and Development for Innovations OP.  
More generally, many Convergence countries face the issue of low general expenditure on 
RTDI. In Greece, the lack of big companies and the sectoral specialisation of Greek industry 
in labour-intensive sectors create an unfavourable environment for such kinds of 
investment. This long-lasting structural problem of the Greek economy became especially 
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evident during the economic crisis. Similarly, innovation is not a main feature in many 
programmes in Hungary (e.g. Dél-Dunántúl OP). There are domestic Hungarian funds such 
as the Baross Gábor Fund that support innovation in a narrow sense, but EU funds are 
largely used for introducing new production capacities or to further develop them. Local 
governments use ‘regeneration’ funds for maintenance investments and amortisation and 
not for development. It is not easy to harmonise Lisbon goals with Hungarian priorities. 
There is still a focus on infrastructure development; ‘development’ is often mistaken for 
refurbishment and maintenance.  
In other Convergence programmes, Lisbon interventions are seen as a strategic priority. 
In Sachsen-Anhalt, the Managing Authority considers it important to support RTDI, not least 
by encouraging the development of broader capacities for R&D and innovation, as an agent 
of broader structural change. Hence, there is a tendency to allocate additional funds to 
Lisbon interventions (e.g. during any re-programming decisions). Yet, there is only limited 
RTDI potential and this causes problems in the take-up of RTDI funds. Many firms in 
Sachsen-Anhalt are parts of larger companies which undertake their R&D outside the Land, 
and many smaller firms have very limited or no capacity for R&D. A similar strategic priority 
on RTDI interventions can be seen in Portugal, underpinned by a much firmer commitment 
in this period to shifting the specialisation profile of the Portuguese economy towards 
higher valued added activities. Take-up has, however been much stronger in the Norte and 
Centro regions than in the Algarve and Alentejo, where the institutional pre-conditions for 
these interventions are much weaker.  
Implementation challenges in other programmes relate to the complexity of innovation-
specific projects. 
x In Italy, the PII (Innovation Industrial Projects) are domestic instruments intended 
to re-launch and upgrade the competitiveness of the Italian productive system by 
adopting a more selective approach to public support for industrial investment. In 
the Research and Competitiveness OP, they are co-financed by the ERDF in 
Convergence regions. Since the PII have complex and time-consuming procedures, 
this has slowed down programme progress.  
x The time to implement Lisbon-related measures has been an issue in ĦlĎskie. In the 
case of some long-term projects implemented by SMEs, entrepreneurs changed 
their company’s status during project implementation. This complicated the signing 
of contracts. In 2009, this problem was addressed by changing implementation 
documents. Moreover, the time needed by beneficiaries to complete the 
documentation was longer than anticipated because of problems with the 
Environmental Impact Assessment. Until 2008, Polish regulations were not adjusted 
to European regulations and beneficiaries had to wait for a new legal act.  
x In Austria, in spite of the federal structure and largely regionalised implementation 
of Structural Funds, RTDI projects rely very much on a specific federal Intermediate 
Body. Yet, the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) has been committing less 
funding than anticipated. The FFG is more cautious in approving project 
applications, after it had negative experiences in the past. Land-level Intermediate 
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Bodies in research and innovation in Niederösterreich and Steiermark can only 
partly make up for the drop out. However, the Austrian authorities are optimistic 
that the new simplified cost options25 might encourage more spending in R&D, as 
this is considered to be an area which involves high staff costs.  
x As in Austria, Nordrhein-Westfalen has experienced implementation difficulties 
relating to a specific body. Some instruments are implemented by the NRW Bank 
(the Land Investment Bank), and delays in setting up the necessary systems and 
procedures within the NRW Bank led to delays in commitments. The Nordrhein-
Westfalen Managing Authority has encouraged and helped the NRW Bank to address 
the organisational problems and to put the necessary implementation systems and 
procedures in place in order to speed up commitments. 
x More generally, in France, delays have occurred due to the cultural change 
involved in the implementation of ‘lisbonised’ programmes. This concerns in 
particular the development of joint research projects, which requires identifying 
and linking new types of beneficiaries, enhanced technical knowledge and longer 
lead times. 
4.4 Optimising performance: strategic and operational measures  
Management and implementation systems provide the crucial link between programme 
objectives and delivery on the ground. Key trends in the arrangements of many countries 
and programmes at the start of the 2007-13 period included stronger strategic 
management, investment in capacity for programme delivery, changes to partnership 
arrangements and new coordination arrangements.26 These trends were by no means 
universal, with change being far more limited where delivery arrangements were firmly 
embedded or mature, and where the Lisbon ‘turn’ in Cohesion policy fitted well with 
existing strategic and implementation frameworks.  
Early experiences with implementation have generally not required further changes to the 
delivery arrangements set up at the outset, although measures have been put into effect to 
deal with some of the challenges reviewed in the previous section. In responding to these 
challenges and in advancing the programmatic goals more generally, the main strategic and 
operational measures of relevance are coordination activities, the acceleration of spending, 
broader programme delivery and administration actions, and project animation and 
selection processes.  
                                                 
25 See also Vironen H (2010) Delivering Structural Funds in Difficult Times: Review of Programme 
Implementation, Summer 2010-Autumn 2010, IQ-Net Review Paper 27(1), European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, p. 29-31. 
 
26 Ferry M, Gross F, Bachtler J and McMaster I (2007) Turning strategies into projects: The 
implementation of 2007-13 Structural Funds programmes, IQ-Net Thematic Paper, 20(2), European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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4.4.1 Formal and informal coordination  
The key formal bodies responsible for the delivery of programme objectives are Managing 
Authorities, Monitoring Committees, associated technical working groups and evaluation 
steering groups. Annual review meetings are also held with the Commission to oversee 
programme progress and discuss the outlook for the rest of the period. Beyond these 
structures, it has not been deemed necessary to set up other formal coordination bodies to 
support the achievement of Lisbon-specific goals, while follow-up of the advancement of 
NRP goals through the NSRFs has more often than not been undertaken on an ad hoc basis 
at national level. Nevertheless, formal and informal coordination bodies play an important 
role across the EU in supporting the effective and efficient functioning of programmes. 
Moreover, as the strategic goals of the programmes are framed by Lisbon goals, the 
monitoring and coordination of the programmes de facto covers Lisbon goals as well.  
Across IQ-Net countries, prominent examples of pro-active coordination bodies bringing 
together national and regional actors include the following. 
x Austrias federal-Land coordination body ÖROK, which is tasked with following 
Lisbon themes as part of its coordinating role. For instance, in April 2008 ÖROK 
presented the role of Structural Funds in R&TD support as part of the STRAT.ATplus 
series of conferences. This included the elaboration of guidance note to define with 
more precision the actions covered in the earmarking codes with R&TD-relevance 
(codes 1-4 and 14). Further, ÖROK’s Sub-committee for regional economy 
(Unterausschuss Regionalwirtschaft) has published so-called technical bulletins to 
clarify all 86 priority themes in more detail.  
x Frances NSRF monitoring group, steered by DATAR since 2008 with the close 
involvement of the Association of French Regions (ARF) and DG Regio. Four 
thematic groups were set up on innovation, sustainable development, urban 
development and ICTs, including representatives of ministries, regional bodies, the 
Commission and economic actors. The groups are responsible for evaluating OP 
implementation, preparing triennial progress reports, formulating recommendations 
to improve the contribution of OPs to Community objectives, and feeding into 
thinking about the future of Cohesion policy. Each group has to submit draft 
recommendations to the monitoring group (GSCRSN) addressed to the Managing 
Authorities in order to improve programming effectiveness (coordination between 
involved actors, animation on the ground, coordination with other funds etc.).  
Another noteworthy example of a national coordination body is Sweden’s national forum for 
regional competitiveness, entrepreneurship and employment, which has recently been 
subject to a review (Box 8). 
As noted, Monitoring Committee meetings and annual review meetings with the Commission 
provide another forum for discussing performance. A common criticism, however, is that 
the formality of the meetings often detracts from strategic discussion and that the agenda 
is often focused on financial implementation or technical issues.  
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x In Germany, an annual meeting of all RCE programme Managing Authorities has 
been set up for the 2007-13 period (a similar meeting already existed for Objective 
1 programmes in previous periods), including staff from the Federal Ministry for the 
Economy and Innovation and from the Commission. However, participants report 
that meetings spend too much time discussing detailed implementation issues and 
little time on the strategic (including Lisbon) goals and content of programmes.  
Box 8: National forum for regional competitiveness, entrepreneurship and employment 
in Sweden 
 
The Swedish national forum for regional competitiveness, entrepreneurship and employment was set 
up in 2007 to engage the regional political representatives in a long-term and strategic dialogue on 
regional development issues. The discussions were organised into four themes (corresponding to the 
four priorities of the NSRF): innovation and renewal; competence development and labour supply; 
accessibility; and strategic cross-border cooperation. Discussions have focused in particular on 
regional enlargement, regional innovation systems, cross-border integration as well as the future 
cohesion policy, local and regional ownership of the Lisbon strategy, and rural development issues.  
 
According to a review of the forum, the discussions have facilitated exchanges of experience and 
learning between the regional politicians and between the regions and the government.27 Although 
the collaboration has in many cases continued successfully outside the forum, a number of 
deficiencies included: unclear aims (whether the forum was for information exchange or discussions); 
the need for other forms of meeting and joint-working (e.g. smaller working groups); and the large 
scale of attendance, due largely to the need for all regions to be represented. The review has 
resulted in an updated work programme for 2009-2013, which attempts to clarify the forum’s aims, 
direction and working methods. Anticipated improvements include a future focus on competence and 
labour market development, the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region, culture and creativity, and 
regional innovation environments.28  
 
 
Informal networks and meetings provide a potential solution to some of the drawbacks 
associated with formal arrangements. 
x In Portugal, the NSRF evaluation recommended the creation of a formal 
coordination body to address weaknesses within the NSRF’s territorial enhancement 
agenda. While the option is currently being examined, and was already foreseen at 
the programming stage, the national authorities are acutely aware of the need to 
minimise complexity and administrative bureaucracy in the governance system. In 
this context, more informal mechanisms have been used to date to address critical 
issues that have arisen. For instance, Managing Authorities were brought together 
to examine and debate the implementation difficulties arising in the Cities Policy - 
which accounts for a third of the mainland ROPs funding and is a central plank of 
the NSRF’s objectives.  
x In Spain, the significant increase in financial resources devoted to R&D and 
innovation in this period has led to the creation of a dedicated network on this 
                                                 
27 Näringsdepartementet, Arbetsprogram för Nationellt forum för regional konkurrenskraft, 
entreprenörskap och sysselsättning 2009  2013, 11 April 2009. 
28 Näringsdepartementet, Strategisk uppföljning av en nationell strategi för regional 
konkurrenskraft, entreprenörskap och sysselsättning 20072013, 2009:69. 
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theme, replicating the existing model of the environmental and equal opportunities 
networks. While the establishment of the network has been delayed as a result of 
Ministerial reorganisation, it is still considered to fill an important strategic 
governance gap for discussing and sharing information about existing practice in 
R&D and innovation policies among managing and implementing bodies. With 
spending now picking up, it is hoped that the network (and others on social 
inclusion and urban development) will become more useful for improving 
coordination, governance and stimulating the exchange of best-practices across the 
regions. A preliminary activity organised prior to the network’s official launch in 
2010 was a conference with France to share experiences on innovation (Box 9). 
Box 9: Exchanging experiences on innovation policy in France and Spain  
 
A joint conference on innovation was organised in May 2009 in Seville by Spain’s Directorate General 
for Community Funds (Ministry of Economy and Finance), the Regional Government of Andalucía, and, 
on the French side, DATAR and the Association of French Regions, along with collaboration from the 
Commission. The event’s agenda included the following presentations, panels and workshops: 
 
 The crucial role of innovation as a factor of global competiveness 
 The state of innovation in Spain and France 
 Round table and plenary on regional innovation strategies in Spain and France 
 Best practice cases  
 Workshop 1. Promoting innovation in small and medium enterprises 
 Workshop 2. National/regional strategies for innovation and governance  
 Workshop 3. Human capital, business and innovation 
 Workshop 4. European financial instruments to support innovation 
 Workshop 5. Innovation Clusters 
 Workshop 6. Innovation in rural, mountainous and coastal areas 
 
 
4.4.2 Accelerat ing expenditure 
The acceleration of spending has been a core objective of the Cohesion policy response to 
the economic crisis within the framework of the EU recovery plan, although provisions were 
also made to allow programme strategies to be adapted to the new socio-economic reality. 
Short-term responses to the crisis could be argued to detract from the long-term and 
structural focus of Cohesion policy investments and to the Lisbon-oriented objectives set in 
the programmes at the outset. In general, however, major changes have not been made to 
programme strategies. And by providing Managing Authorities with a tool to maintain or 
drive forward planned programme objectives - in the context of a restrictive investment 
climate for the public and private sectors - the measures can be seen as being ‘pro-Lisbon’.  
As reported in previous IQ-Net research,29 the most highly valued measure was the increase 
in programme advances. While the aim was mainly to support liquidity among private and 
public beneficiaries, a frequently reported benefit was the contribution towards the 
achievement of n+2 targets for 2009. Some Managing Authorities, by contrast, raised 
questions about the measure’s efficacy, e.g. where the transfer of advances was not 
                                                 
29 Mendez C and Kah S (2009), Op. Cit.; See also: Bachtler J and Mendez C (2010) Review and 
Assessment of Simplification Measures in Cohesion Policy 2007-2013, Report to Policy Department B: 
Structural and Cohesion Policies, DG for Internal Policies, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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permitted under domestic legislation or because of the risks to Managing Authorities in 
advancing funds without having fully checked (or certified) the expenditure.  
The take-up and usefulness of the measure on major project reimbursements without 
Commission approval varied depending on the nature of the programmes and the extent to 
which this form of assistance is used. In Greece, several programmes planned to implement 
major projects, and the measure was regarded as a positive decision, not least given 
previous experiences when it could take up to two years from the initial request to get 
approval from the Commission. Although viewed as a positive development in several other 
IQ-Net countries (e.g. Portugal, France), some Managing Authorities considered the impact 
to be modest due to the small number of major projects planned, particularly under the 
RCE Objective. 
In order to support enterprises, particularly SMEs, the conditions governing the payment of 
advances within the framework of EU State aid rules were made more flexible by allowing 
State aid advances to reach 100 percent of the total aid until 2010, instead of only 35 
percent. The measure was reported to be a particularly positive development in Greece, 
and there were plans to use it in France and Slovenia, although its impact was considered 
to be diluted by the temporary nature of the measure. Several other IQ-Net Managing 
Authorities did not perceive the measure to be particularly important or relevant. 
Frontloading of planned investment was actively adopted in several IQ-Net countries and 
programmes (e.g. Finland, Hungary, Poland, Scotland). Among the key perceived benefits 
were: increasing the amount of public funding available in a period of fiscal restraint; 
assisting compliance with the n+2 rule; and reducing the pressure associated with spending 
at the end of the programme period and thereby allowing programme actors to focus on 
closure. In other cases, the measure was seen as unnecessary and potential disadvantages 
were noted. While front-loading may be positive in terms of spending, it can also mean that 
the projects would not necessarily be focused on tackling the new problems. Also, it may 
store up funding constraints for future projects. 
As noted, strategic modifications have not generally been made to programme objectives - 
confirming that the Lisbon focus in the programmes has not been lost in responding to the 
crisis - although shifts in funding across (and often within) priorities have been agreed or 
proposed. 
x In the Czech Republic, Enterprise and Innovations reallocations across and within 
Priorities were approved in July 2010. The programme had already a strong focus on 
Lisbon priority themes, but the support to earmarked categories was strengthened 
via the categories of investment in firms directly linked to research and innovation, 
other investment in firms, renewable energies and energy efficiency.  
x In Vlaanderen, there were signs that there would not be enough absorption 
capacity for the funds initially allocated Priority 2 (entrepreneurship), as 
considerable Flemish funding is available for this type of support anyway. For this 
reason, a proposal has been made to the Commission to reallocate some €15m to 
Priority 3 (spatial-economic environment). 
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x In Hungary, the main financial reallocations during 2009 concerned National 
Programmes. As noted earlier, the ESF-financed Social Renewal OP reallocated 
€76.9 million from Priority 2 (Improving adaptability) to Priority 1 (Improving 
employability, promoting entry to the labour market) in order to increasing funding 
for active labour market interventions as well as supporting disadvantaged people 
and persons made redundant as a result of the crisis. 
x In Scotland, the Managing Authority proposed that the level of national funding 
under Priority 1 (Research and Innovation) be increased, while decreasing finds for 
Priority 3 (urban development) in response to match-finding problems. 
4.4.3 Programme management and administrat ion 
The most obvious effect of the new Lisbon orientation on the operational management and 
administration of programmes is that the Lisbon earmarking codes now form an integral and 
routine part of the monitoring, reporting and financial planning activities discharged by 
Managing Authorities. Nevertheless, the core dynamics underpinning programme 
management remain rooted in unchanged features of the regulatory design of the 
implementing framework. As argued by the Sachsen-Anhalt Managing Authority, the main 
management tool used to inform decisions relating to the allocation and re-programming of 
Structural Funds resources remains the financial plan and the extent to which different 
priorities, measures and actions are showing progress (or are reasonably expected to show 
future progress) towards meeting financial targets. More generally, the imperative of n+2 
compliance remains as strong as ever across the EU, and financial absorption continues to 
be a dominant force in programme management and administration decision-making 
processes. In fact, many programme managers argue that the n+2 pressures are even 
greater, given the more innovative types of interventions being funded and the associated 
risks of projects defaulting or being subject to delays. 
While there is much functional continuity in programme management and administration 
activity, it is also evident that adaptation and learning has been required where significant 
changes have been witnessed in the content of programmes. In Alsace, for instance, dealing 
with Lisbon-type projects has involved acquiring new competences on a needs basis, 
notably relating to national and Community regulations relating to competitiveness 
poles/clusters, financial engineering instruments, ICTs, industrial parks and business 
support.  
Training measures to improve the capabilities of Managing Authorities and Intermediate 
Bodies have been employed in most IQ-Net programmes, but often relating to general 
(rather than Lisbon-specific) programme administration tasks. 
x In Finland, the capabilities of the authorities have improved in the course of the 
programme period due to experience and learning. Some training has also taken 
place, although some officials take the view that the training has been too focused 
on administrative issues rather than on the content of the policy. 
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x In Vlaanderen, more attention has been devoted to training in the Managing 
Authority and the contact points in the provinces. This has taken the form of 
seminars and exchange of experience, but it has not specifically been Lisbon-
related. Nevertheless, training has generally been deemed to be effective and has 
encouraged the Managing Authority and the contact points to develop a shared 
vision and generally to give the same message to beneficiaries.  
x In France, DATAR, in the framework of the NSRF Monitoring Group, decided to 
enhance technical assistance on a number of themes within the framework of the 
NSRF Monitoring Group. Many of these relate to Lisbon-type projects although the 
training is on technical administrative issues (e.g. Article 55, flat costs, indirect 
costs, financial engineering). This will be provided in the context of a framework 
contract that is currently being set up at the national level. Programme managers 
will have the opportunity to draw on this contract on a needs basis. 
x In North East England, programme progress has been made more difficult by a 
perceived lack of clarity over regulatory questions and uncertainty over eligibility 
issues. The ERDF Secretariat worked closely with national and EU-level colleagues 
to agree guidance. A series of guidance notes were developed and issued, in 
addition a number of information events, workshops and practitioner network 
meetings were held with partners to promote understanding and best practice and 
encourage an acceleration of project implementation. 
A further measure that can be employed to facilitate programme administration is the use 
of the simplified costs options. The Nordrhein-Westfalen Managing Authority is considering 
the use of the rules relating to flat rate costs, motivated by challenges that have arisen 
under specific Lisbon-related interventions. In particular, this concerns the calculation and 
provision of evidence relating to staff costs for R&D projects where the majority of costs 
relate to staff. There are often difficulties in demonstrating costs because some R&D-
oriented firms and research centres do not require staff to fill in work-plans and have a 
working culture where managers do not want to (be seen to) check up too closely on staff 
activities. It remains to be seen, however, if the simplification option is feasible in the 
Nordrhein-Westfalen programme. Prominent IQ-Net examples that have made use of the 
simplified costs options - and are highlighted in the Commission recent report on the 
Cohesion policy response to the crisis - include Vlaanderen, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom (Box 10). 
Other management and administration measures which aim to facilitate the pursuit of 
programme objectives or Lisbon-related thematic priorities in specific countries or regions 
include: 
x A dedicated IT platform for business aid schemes: In Portugal, an IT system has 
been set up for the business aid schemes, offering a range of management 
advantages for the NOP Competitiveness and ROPs implementing the schemes: the 
use of a single portal for receiving all applications across the country; automated 
links to Intermediate Bodies and other actors involved in project appraisal and 
selection; standardization of procedures for appraisal, selection, monitoring and 
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closure of projects; faster appraisal times and accelerated decision-making; 
harmonized real-time data for the coordination, management and overall 
assessment of effectiveness, while allowing comparisons between projects and 
programmes; and paperless workflows through electronic-only processes.  
Box 10: Simplified costs options30
 
Flanders: Depending on the type of project and costs the authorities use standard scales of unit costs 
for staff (based on national standards), flat rates to calculate indirect costs (i.e. costs which are not 
directly linked to the project, but which are necessary for its implementation) and, where necessary, 
real costs to cover other ‘non standard’ direct expenditure. The method is used in projects involving 
training, career guidance, etc. Lump sums are also used where it is possible to define a standard price 
for operations, for example in the preparatory phase of transnational projects: here, there are clearly 
defined actions, goals and results (i.e. three months to carry out desk research, define the scope of 
the project and do a baseline study) and based on past experience it is possible to calculate the sum 
required to obtain these results. 
 
Denmark: is one of the countries for which the Commission has approved a flat-rate for indirect 
costs. It is the same flat-rate for the ERDF and ESF Operational Programmes (same Managing Authority 
and essentially identical implementation rules), which greatly enhances the simplification for project 
applicants, the regional and national growth centres, and the Managing Authority.  
 
United Kingdom: the Commission approved the method of the Welsh authorities for the use of 
indirect costs declared on a flat-rate basis for both ERDF and ESF-funded programmes. The scheme 
entails working out an estimate at the beginning of a project which would then be fixed for its 
duration. 
 
 
x Centralised programme management: In Flanders, the most important strategic 
change in the 2007-13 period has been the centralisation of management 
responsibilities in one regional programme (rather than sub-regional programmes), 
motivated by the aim of encouraging bigger and better projects. The change is 
regarded as being positive and effective overall, although it took some time for all 
parties involved to adjust to the new way of interacting and working with each 
other.  
x Delegated responsibilities to sub-regional platforms: The ĦlĎskie ROP has set up 
sub-regional platforms to encourage partnership working at local level. Projects 
implemented by neighbouring communities are the most popular partnership 
applications, followed by cooperation between counties and their communities. Of 
note in relation to the Lisbon priority themes is that Priority 2 on the information 
society is one of the most common themes for partnership applications (for instance 
there are several IT systems projects).  
x Integrated management of ERDF and ESF: In Finland, the concentration of 
Managing Authority responsibilities for both funds in a single Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy has provided a better basis for clearer and more 
                                                 
30 European Commission (2010) Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘Cohesion Policy: Responding to the 
economic crisis’ A review of the implementation of cohesion policy measures adopted in support of 
the European Economic Recovery Plan, SEC(2010) 1291 final, Brussels. 
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harmonised implementation of Structural Funds than in the past and has also led to 
better steering of the Intermediate Bodies. 
4.4.4 Project generation, appraisal and selection 
Programme managing authorities depend on networks of intermediaries, promoters and 
project implementers for successful programme delivery. This leads to the need both for 
effective communication and coordination.  
x In Aquitaine, ‘mandates’ have been issued to certain actors in order to enhance 
project animation in Lisbon-related interventions (e.g. the Regional Innovation Agency 
for Priority 1).  
x In Nordrhein-Westfalen, efforts have focused on ensuring that the necessary systems 
and procedures were set up in the NRW Bank because of delays in commitments in 
relation to some specific innovation-related instruments. The Managing Authority has 
helped the NRW Bank to address the organisational problems and to put the necessary 
implementation systems and procedures in place in order to speed up commitments. 
To raise awareness among beneficiaries of funding opportunities, Managing Authorities 
utilise a range of project animation and programme publicity tools, including programme 
websites, guidance documents, newsletters, wider media marketing (in newspapers, 
television and radio), seminars and workshops. 
x In Aquitaine, a guide for firms was published at the start of the programming 
period and has been updated since. It includes information on the types of project 
that receive support, contact details for support and advice, the basic principles for 
receiving European funding and the main stages of the application circuit.31  
x The main measure to support project animation in Greece in key Lisbon-related 
measures has been media publicity, notably for SME support schemes.  
x In Portugal, Cohesion policy has a strong web presence through the interlinked 
NSRF and programme websites, which offer daily updates of project calls, deadlines 
and extensions  
x In the Czech Republic, the Managing Authority of the Enterprise and Innovations OP 
organizes conferences and other communication stimulating activities on a regular 
basis, including information workshops for firms. The main focus is on addressing 
the difficulties faced by beneficiaries in making applications and minimising 
commonly-made errors. 
x In Scotland, ESEP (the Intermediate Administration Body) has held awareness-
raising seminars targeted at potential applicants.  
                                                 
31 Préfecture de la Région Aquitaine et Région Aquitaine (2007) Guide pratique pour les entreprises, 
Programme compétitivité régionale et emploi 2007-2013. 
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x In Flanders, the contact points in the provinces are actively encouraged to help 
project beneficiaries draw up applications. 
Increasing the frequency, deadlines and volume of funding for calls can help to support 
project activity, particularly to offset the effects of the crisis  
x In Portugal, funding for project calls with the greatest demand from firms was 
raised in 2009 along with the relaxation of financing conditions and an extension of 
the scope of eligible investments.  
x In North East England, changes were made to the commissioning process under 
Priority 1 (Exploiting and enhancing innovation) during 2009, resulting in a call open 
for a longer period, to allow partners maximum flexibility to exploit available 
match funding, and to respond quickly to economic shocks.  
x In the Czech OP Enterprise and Innovations, the allocations for calls were increased 
by some 30 percent above what was originally planned and published faster. 
Measures can also be employed to raise the quality of project applications and to ensure 
that projects are implemented as anticipated 
x With this purpose in mind, an indicator guide was published by DATAR in early 
2008.32 It contains inter alia information on qualitative criteria for project 
appraisal with a particular focus on innovation, ICT and carbon neutrality. Detailed 
notes have been provided on these themes, including information on the definition 
of innovation and ICT as well as targeted projects, and guidance on how to appraise 
and rank the innovative/ ICT character of a project.  
x In the Czech Republic, the Managing Authority of the Enterprise and Innovations OP 
has introduced minor changes to the project assessment criteria to enhance the 
focus on quality. 
More widespread efforts can be seen to fine-tune and speed up project selection 
approaches and procedures. 
x In Hungarys Dél-Dunántúl OP a simplified procedure was introduced in March 2009 
to accelerate the project selection process.  
x Project appraisal services in Aquitaine have received support to reduce project 
selection delays, but also to speed up expenditure checks (e.g. by outsourcing of 
certain controls).  
x In Nordrhein-Westfalen, the competitive call for tender approach has been 
evaluated and there are plans to make some minor changes to the implementation 
                                                 
32 DIACT (2008) Programmes opérationnels FEDER Objectifs Convergence et Compétitivité Régionale et 
Emploi – Contrats de Projets Etat-Régions, Guide de renseignement des indicateurs nationaux 2007-
13. 
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of these calls with the aim of improving processes relating to the design and launch 
of calls, and also to the allocation of commitments.  
x An evaluation has also been carried out in Portugal on the regulations governing the 
different interventions, which will inform plans to improve the coherence and 
harmonisation of selection criteria across and within programmes.  
x In Greece, a Ministerial Decision in June 2010 included, amongst other issues, the 
requirement for implementing bodies and Managing Authorities to keep to the 
formal deadlines for project appraisal, selection and subsequent payments to 
beneficiaries.  
x In Vlaanderen, decisions on proposals are taken very quickly, made possible by 
dealing with the technical aspects of the projects at a later point. But decisions are 
always conditional upon a technical review that has to address problems such as 
funding gaps. There are currently attempts to conduct the technical review before 
the Monitoring Committee decision in order to shorten the time between project 
approval and the actual start date and so that the beneficiary knows even before 
the review which points will need to be addressed later.  
 
4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation 
The role of monitoring and evaluation is to provide information and evidence on the 
performance of programmes, including in relation to Lisbon objectives and priorities. 
Several elements of the new Cohesion policy regulatory framework for the 2007-13 period 
are of note in this respect. As noted, the earmarking rules require Managing Authorities to 
provide an indicative breakdown of the allocation of funding to Lisbon-related thematic 
priorities in the programmes, which must be followed-up yearly in Annual Implementation 
Reports submitted to the Commission and approved by Monitoring Committees. Further, the 
monitoring and reporting of output and results targets and achievements are only required 
at the level of priority axes, reflecting the simplified and more strategic planning 
framework in the current period. Lastly, a more flexible and needs-based evaluation system 
has been introduced, in essence devolving responsibility for the timing and focus of 
evaluations to the Member States. This implies that it is up to Managing Authorities to 
decide whether and how to evaluate the achievement of Lisbon goals or particular thematic 
priorities. 
4.5.1 Monitoring 
The research conducted among IQ-Net programme authorities for this paper suggests that 
the Lisbon ‘turn’ has had two key effects on the monitoring of programmes. First, the shift 
in the thematic content of programmes has unsurprisingly led to changed to the types of 
indicators used, with a greater focus on Lisbon-related priorities (RTD, innovation, 
renewable energies etc.) than in the past, both in terms of context indicators and also in 
relation to outputs and results. Nevertheless, programme monitoring remains heavily 
focused on financial performance (spending) rather than policy outcomes (outputs and 
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results). Second, and related, Managing Authorities have had to incorporate the earmarking 
codes into their monitoring systems, and these are now routinely used for financial 
planning, monitoring and reporting purposes.  
According to the Commission33, the main value of earmarking is that it has improved the 
quality and focus of programming. Interviews with IQ-Net Managing Authorities provide 
some support for this claim. For instance, the Sachsen-Anhalt Managing Authority argues 
that one advantage of using the Lisbon codes is that it allows the Monitoring Committee to 
take decisions on the allocation and re-allocation of funding between different kinds of 
instrument and forces ministries to justify the inclusion of various instruments in the 
programmes. On the other hand, some other Managing Authorities have not seen any 
particular benefits arising upstream of the programme design stage, particularly where 
domestic strategies are closely aligned with the Lisbon agenda and funding allocations are 
relatively low. For instance, the Managing Authority for Scotland notes that it reports on 
Lisbon codes to demonstrate progress on themes (as required for the Strategic Report or AIR 
process), but that this is not part of the Advisory Group process or the appraisal of 
applications.  
A range of other conceptual, methodological and operational difficulties were also noted. 
From a conceptual perspective, the earmarking categories cover financial inputs only, and 
there is no linkage with the indicators selected as part of the Lisbon agenda (or context 
indicators in the programmes). As noted, the focus on financial inputs may encourage 
excessive priority to be placed on spending rather than attainment of objectives. Another 
problem with the conceptual rationale of the earmarking approach is that it is blind to 
different socio-economic contexts. Interviewees in Poland, noted that earmarking ignores 
the fact that in different regions operations under the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda 
will inevitably be very different (linked to varied socio-economic conditions). Moreover, 
even if not assigned to a pro-Lisbon category, certain types of expenditure such as 
transport and urban/rural regeneration undoubtedly contribute to economic growth. Similar 
conceptual difficulties were identified by Managing Authorities in Greece during the 
programming phase, especially in RCE regions, as the structure and the development needs 
of particular regions (e.g. the Notio Aigaio Region is an insular area, whereas Sterea Ellada 
is an agricultural region) are not well served by the classification of thematic priorities 
which are taken into account for the earmarking estimation. 
The main methodological difficulty is that the earmarking codes are broad and not well-
defined, so it is not always clear to which code expenditure under a project or measure 
should be allocated. There has been some uncertainty in this respect and the scope for 
interpretation is wide. Examples given by Austrian interviewees are codes 7 and 8, where 
there is no obvious difference, while code 8 is often used for tourism measures in Austria, 
which has led to discussions about the relevance of tourism for innovation. A concrete 
example given by interviewees from Slovenia is a day-care centre project. This is supported 
under the ERDF and falls under Code 75 ‘Education Infrastructure’. But it is also social 
                                                 
33 European Commission (2010) Cohesion policy: Strategic Report 2010 on the implementation of the 
programmes 2007-2013, SEC(2010) 360 final, Brussels. 
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infrastructure (e.g. Code 79), since it helps women to get back into work. The 
methodological challenges are complicated by the fact that within a single project, one 
part can be Lisbon-relevant, while another is not. Moving beyond financial inputs to actual 
objectives reveals similar difficulties because projects can have impacts on multiple 
objectives (e.g. a transport project can also reduce CO2 emissions). 
These methodological challenges have important operational consequences. In particular, 
these uncertainties mean that the classification of earmarking expenditure can vary across 
and within programmes. The system is based on the assumption that different regions 
within a country or different Intermediate Bodies within a programme have classified their 
interventions or projects correctly in relation to the Lisbon codes yet this may not be so. 
Indeed, significant differences across Managing Authorities were observed by one 
interviewee, because the main priority at the start of the period was on launching the 
programmes and getting the management systems in place.  
This highlights the importance of adequate preparation at the start of the programme 
period. Where the Lisbon coding process was regarded as being straightforward, as in 
Portugal, detailed guidance was provided to the Managing Authorities on how they should 
categorise their projects early on and no significant difficulties have been faced during 
implementation.  
Another operational difficulty is that the monitoring/programming process has become 
more complex. Financial plans (or internal programme complements) are often highly 
disaggregated, requiring the monitoring of the Lisbon codes to be undertaken at a very 
detailed level, namely at the level of actions or even operations. Indeed, the programmes 
had to be broken down to this level in order to quantify the earmarking allocations, which 
required a major effort in some large programmes. Additionally, the Lisbon codes are 
usually not fully contained within specific priorities, nor does the logic of the programmes 
necessarily follow the logic of the codes. Difficulties with the extraction of the data were 
also reported in some programmes. 
Moreover, the programming of earmarking allocations has become more restrictive than 
envisioned in the regulations, particularly as a result of the recent simplification measures. 
For instance, when the OP for North-East England was being negotiated, the Regional 
Development Agency (One North East) was assured that the categorisation of Lisbon codes 
was indicative (i.e. giving a broad idea of the amount to be spent under each code) and 
purely for information purposes (as stated in the regulations), and that the programme 
could not be held to the categorisation made. Through changes to Article 56 in the recent 
simplification measures, the RDA is now having problems with spending under the 
entrepreneurship code. Entrepreneurship is an integral part of the programme, but it was 
‘omitted’ from the ‘indicative’ coding table in the OP as the activity was at the time felt to 
be adequately covered by ‘business support’. Because it was not included in the original OP 
coding table, nothing can now be allocated against it unless approval from the Commission 
is obtained, and spend will only be eligible from the date of approval. An unintended 
consequence of the simplification measures has been to make it more difficult to spend, 
even on Lisbon categories, rather than making the programme more flexible. Put 
differently, this ‘sets in stone’ proposed expenditure from 2006/07 until 2013 regardless of 
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socio-economic changes and prevents Managing Authorities from being responsive to 
changing conditions.  
A final challenge is the exploitation of the earmarking data. Managing Authorities are now 
required to collect vast monitoring data-sets combining earmarking themes with forms of 
financing and geographical dimensions. While these data are a rich and potentially very 
useful resource, they are not systematically exploited by Managing Authorities or the 
Commission for strategic and operational purposes.  
4.5.2 Evaluation 
The focus on Lisbon agenda objectives and themes in evaluation plans varies across EU 
countries, reflecting the increased flexibility granted to Member States in the regulatory 
requirements in the 2007-13 period. An earlier review of evaluation plans showed that the 
requirement to provide a strategic report on the contribution of Cohesion policy to the 
Community Strategic Guidelines and to the Lisbon agenda (in 2009 and 2012) explicitly 
informed the design of NSRF evaluations in a number of partner countries, namely in the 
Czech Republic, France, Poland and Portugal, as well as in other Member States, 
particularly from the EU12, like Latvia and Lithuania.34  
To date, only a limited number of evaluations have been undertaken at programme level, 
and these have often related to operational issues. However, many evaluations are 
currently being launched or planned at the mid-term stage with a strong focus on Lisbon 
objectives and themes.  
x One example is France, where a survey of regional evaluation plans undertaken by 
DATAR at the end of 2008 revealed that Lisbon themes (innovation, 
competitiveness, R&D, ICT, firm support) were at the top of the list of themes to 
be evaluated. Some regions planned to carry out several evaluations on the 
different thematic priorities, with six regions planning to carry out four evaluations 
or more on Lisbon-related topics. In terms of sub-themes, regions are most 
interested in evaluating innovation and the competitiveness of firms (two-thirds of 
planned evaluations) and much less in traditional themes, such as enterprise 
support.35  
x In Portugal, a global NSRF evaluation has provided some insights on the potential 
achievement of Lisbon-related thematic priorities and objectives. However, it will 
be the mid-term cycle of programme evaluations that will provide a better 
assessment of the achievement of objectives based on mid-term results data. 
x In the Czech Republic, there is a proposal to cover the Lisbon agenda (and 
earmarking) in the mid-term evaluation of the NSRF for 2011. 
                                                 
34 Polverari et al. (2007), Op. Cit. 
35 DIACT and ARF (2009) Le concept d’innovation technologique et organisationnelle dans les POs 
FEDER et CPER 2007-2013, Rapport final, p. 74-77. 
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x In Sachsen-Anhalt, a mid-term evaluation is being undertaken in 2010-11, covering 
all aspects of the ERDF, ESF and EAFRD programmes, including the implementation 
of the Lisbon approach. 
Looking at prominent Lisbon-related themes, examples of strategic evaluations that have 
been finalised or launched include:  
x Innovation: In France, several regions have launched evaluations on: ICT 
(Aquitaine); the effectiveness of knowledge transfer from public/private research 
activities to firms, notably SMEs (Basse-Normandie); development of research and 
innovation and adaptability of workers to economic change, including the role of 
the Regional Innovation Strategy (Centre); innovation, including the role of RIS 
(Franche-Comté); and management of the global grant on innovation (Provence-
Alpes-Côtes d’Azur). (See also Box 11). In Spain, the first evaluation to be 
undertaken with a Lisbon focus will be on R&D and innovation in 2011, covering all 
NOPs and ROPs. ĦlĎskie, plans to evaluate innovation projects realised in the ROP. 
Box 11: A reference framework for assessing societal and territorial innovation in 
France 
 
In April 2009, a reference document was prepared on the evaluation of societal and territorial 
innovation.36 The main objective was to assess the programmes’ contribution to the Lisbon strategy 
and to provide a reference framework for future evaluation work. Another key aim was to improve 
expertise on different conceptions and types of innovation, beyond the technological and 
organisational types. Based on this, a report was produced on the role of innovation in regional OPs.37 
It found that, while the programmes are very similar in terms of objectives, there is strong variety 
regarding interventions and financial allocations. There are two types of intervention strategies (and 
many cases where the situation is mixed): 
 
(a) regions which give priority to the development/ structuring the supply-side of technological 
innovation (e.g. funding for research infrastructure) but face difficulties with project development; 
and 
 
(b) regions which focus on accelerating/ optimising existing networks (e.g. via financial instruments), 
showing a more dynamic programming approach in this field. 
 
A further study was carried out based on monitoring data to determine the contribution of 
programmes to NSRF objectives, notably Lisbon, across all priority themes. This includes analyses of 
individual OPs with respect to their innovation focus (e.g. technological or not) providing an overview 
of earmarking intentions at the measure level. It also outlines regional good practices. The exercise, 
which was based on interviews with regional programme managers, is also supposed to feed into a 
possible NSRF review in 2010.38 It is also found to have eased programme steering, monitoring 
(regarding earmarking categories), and communication.  
 
 
x Entrepreneurship: In ĦlĎskie, there is also an intention to evaluate actions 
directed to enterprises and to examine how ROP projects influence the level of 
employment and enterprises’ competiveness. In Sachsen-Anhalt, evaluations are 
                                                 
36 DIACT and ARF (2009) Référentiel d’évaluation de l’innovation sociétale et territoriale. 
37 DIACT and ARF (2009) Le concept d’innovation technologique et organisationnelle dans les POs 
FEDER et CPER 2007-2013, Rapport final. 
38 Rapport Stratégique 2009, p. 21. 
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being carried out on support for business start-ups and financial engineering 
instruments and loan funds; the main findings to date are that there are several 
targeted instruments justified in terms of business needs, and that it is reasonable 
to continue with these instruments and also to establish further instruments. In 
Sweden, evaluations are being undertaken on clusters and incubators  
x Employment/cohesion: In Sachsen-Anhalt, an evaluation has been launched on the 
transition from education into work. In Sweden, an evaluation of the horizontal 
priorities of integration and diversity has been finalised; among the findings is that 
the theme is difficult to integrate consistently with the programme objectives 
producing a recommendation to raise awareness on the theme.39  
When asked about the challenges of evaluation Lisbon agenda objectives and themes, IQ-
Net Managing Authorities provided mixed responses. For some, there are no problems other 
than those related to any evaluation work (e.g. difficulties with indicators and data). 
Others pointed to specific difficulties, as follows. 
First, the Lisbon objectives are considered to be vague. As noted in a summary of 
evaluations undertaken in Sweden:40 “The overall objective of the Structural Funds 
programmes is to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda. 
Similarly to the Lisbon Agenda, the overall objectives of the Structural Funds are broadly 
defined and relatively ambiguous. This overall objective entails that the EU should become 
the world's most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010. For such a 
general objective, it is difficult to carry out clear-cut evaluations on the effects or results. 
Improved competitiveness and employment in the Lisbon Agenda are not just about newly 
created jobs and businesses, but also about 'better' jobs, more innovative businesses, and 
regional growth. 
Second, it was argued that the Lisbon agenda, or at least the policy discourse, has a 
simplistic understanding of growth and jobs. In Wales, the ex ante evaluations did not refer 
to the significant contributions to jobs and growth expected from the OPs, especially the 
larger ones, pointing out that the quality of economic development is much more important 
than a mechanistic job count. In East Wales, for example, there are ‘pockets’ of 
employment problems but the labour market is generally strong, so it would be unrealistic 
to expect the creation of many additional jobs. In a rural economy such as the Highlands 
and Islands, the issue is to maintain rather than create employment. Similarly, in Sweden, 
the recent programme evaluation of Mellersta Norrland concluded that the answer to 
whether the results are good or bad depends on one’s perspective: “If the emphasis is on 
strengthening competitiveness among firms and industries, then the results are quite 
good. If, however, the emphasis is on the rapid and extensive creation of new firms and 
jobs, then the results are not especially good. 
                                                 
39 Brulin G, Jansson S, Andersson M, Svensson L, and Uliczka H (2009) Vad har vi lärt I halvtid?, 
Erfarenheter från genomförandet av de regionala strukturfondsprogrammen och 
Socialfondsprogrammet, November 2009, p. 43. 
40 Ibid. p. 23. 
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Third, there are several methodological challenges with the evaluation of RTD and 
innovation policies. The impact of innovation policies is difficult to measure due to time-
lags, with structural effects only being visible in the medium to long-term. Assessing or 
quantifying intangible investments is also difficult. Related, there can be a lack of 
experience. In France, for instance, the NSRF monitoring group (ICT sub-group) has 
recommended that methodological tools should be developed to evaluate ICT interventions 
(e.g. in terms of reductions of traffic and printouts) in order to establish the carbon 
footprint of the digital economy.41  
Last, there is a conflict of rationales between the evaluation of these policies and the 
administrative framework for delivery. Support for innovation is inherently risky, as the 
objective is to encourage private and public sectors to take risks, including the risk to fail. 
However, the administrative system of Cohesion policy does not sufficiently incentivise this, 
preferring ‘safe bets’ instead.  
5. EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS FOR EUROPE 2020 
The experiences in this new period clearly indicate a much closer alignment of Cohesion 
policy strategies with the Lisbon agenda, driven by the new strategic planning framework, 
the earmarking tool and reporting requirements. These governance devices have helped to 
steer programme objectives, priorities and funding towards Lisbon-related objectives and 
priorities. In particular, the main benefits of the new framework reported by programme 
managers are that is has helped to clarify the linkages with the Lisbon agenda, enabled the 
design of more focused programmes and performance-oriented management systems, and 
facilitated comparison of strategies.  
However, weaknesses in the effectiveness of the new approach have also been identified. 
The NSRFs were designed broadly with less strategic focus than anticipated and the Lisbon 
priorities pursued by the strategies and operational programmes were often in line with 
domestic priorities anyway. The earmarking instrument has certainly encouraged a shift in 
expenditure towards Lisbon-related thematic priorities, but it has been criticised for being 
too top-down, increasingly inflexible, administratively demanding and placing too much 
emphasis on spending rather than outputs and outcomes. Strategic reporting has often been 
treated as a compliance exercise with limited strategic value due to data limitations, 
methodological difficulties and the lack of priority placed on the NSRF upstream of 
programming in many countries. Even though the new strategic approach may have 
increased awareness and ownership of the Lisbon agenda among programme managers and 
secretariats, it is less clear whether this is the case among funding beneficiaries or citizens 
more generally. Programme managers also continue to perceive an excessive burden of 
administration, which detracts attention from the delivery of programme and Lisbon goals. 
Turning to contemporary debates on the future of Cohesion policy and the revised Lisbon 
agenda, most Managing Authorities are supportive of a close alignment with Europe 2020. 
                                                 
41 Groupe de suivi du CRSN (2010) Projet de recommandations du groupe thématique « TIC » au 
Groupe de suivi du CRSN en vue d'améliorer les résultats de la programmation FEDER, 20.01.2010. 
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Indeed, many see the ‘new’ EU priorities as being in line with current programmes and/or 
with domestic policy trends. There are several lessons to emerge from the experience of 
the Lisbon Agenda. 
In the view of IQ-Net partners, the first lesson is the need for Europe 2020 to have a 
territorial dimension with a clearer spatial strategy and commitment to cohesion. Further, 
Managing Authorities underlined the importance of securing local and regional 
understanding and ownership of EU and National Reform Programme objectives and of the 
implementation of the strategies. But concerns were raised about the use of 
conditionalities, especially the idea of linking disbursement of Cohesion policy funding to 
policy objectives in unrelated policy areas, such as debt levels under the stability and 
growth pact. 
In relation to the strategic planning framework, a message to emerge from the research is 
that more coherence is needed between Cohesion policy strategies, EU objectives and 
National Reform Programmes. As noted, in the current period the links in NSRFs and OPs 
were often weak or vague, particularly regarding the relevance and contribution of 
indicators and targets to those included in National Reform Programmes. Coherence is also 
needed in the timing of the processes, which have tended to function independently - as 
evidenced by Cohesion policy having to adapt to broader EU objectives (or be seen to do so) 
after the approval of its governing framework in the previous two policy reforms.  
With regard to programming, Managing Authorities tend to agree on the need for greater 
concentration on clearer and fewer objectives and thematic priorities. Firmer EU 
regulatory requirements are, however, needed to enable Managing Authorities to resist 
domestic political pressures to disperse funding across different ministries and types of 
intervention. At the same time, most Managing Authorities also call for sufficient flexibility 
to adapt EU priorities to local conditions, while others consider that greater concentration 
will be an inevitable consequence of anticipated funding cuts to their programme 
allocations.  
Greater concentration on objectives can also be achieved by ensuring that the programme 
planning process follows a comprehensive and logical framework, encompassing the 
identification of priorities, interventions and physical indicators. Problems arise when this 
process is divided into different components which are governed by distinctive logics (e.g. 
when the logic of the programme planning or goal-setting process is separated from the 
process of identifying spending codes and linking these to physical indicators and 
instruments). More can also be done to encourage integrated territorial strategies. The 
limited Commission methodological guidance on this topic is considered surprising, given 
that it is often proclaimed as the main asset of the policy. Related, there is scope for 
merging programmes in some countries, particularly in the EU12, to support more 
integrated approaches where there is scope for synergies and to reduce administrative 
burdens by reducing the number of programmes. 
The earmarking instrument provides a useful tool to support concentration efforts, 
although it is not a sufficient condition in itself, particularly given the breadth of categories 
in the classification and the provisions to allow additional categories to be negotiated in 
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NSRFs. A key lesson is the need for more precisely defined earmarking categories and 
uniform reporting of data. A guidance note could be developed by the Commission on this, 
which would be particularly important to ensure consistency across Member States and 
enable more robust comparative analysis across the EU. The current thresholds are 
generally regarded as being satisfactory and some Managing Authorities would be concerned 
about the introduction of a stricter approach, e.g. if there was a suggestion that one-third 
of funding should go to a specific thematic priority. In this respect, it is argued that the 
regulations should return to the original intentions of categorising spending 
indicatively/broadly to the Europe 2020 guidelines, avoiding the introduction of 
unnecessarily restrictive rules that make legitimate activities ineligible for support. 
Concerns were also expressed about the coherence between Europe 2020 objectives for the 
digital economy and earmarking provisions on ICTs, which exclude broadband infrastructure 
form RCE objective regions. 
Moving from programming to implementation, the core message from Managing Authorities 
is the need for genuine simplification. Many consider that the main problem with ‘Lisbon’ 
is that the regulatory framework does not focus sufficiently on the content of the 
programmes but instead concentrates on bureaucratic rules. There is a need for more 
discussion at EU-level on how Managing Authorities can ensure that the programmes 
genuinely contribute to the Lisbon goals and to innovation oriented economic development. 
One recommendation is to promote the study of best practice projects linked to EU 
objectives and especially their transferability to other contexts, rather than merely 
showcasing them as is done at present. 
Finally, scope for improvement in strategic reporting was identified in three main areas. 
More coherence and alignment with reporting on national reform programmes is needed. 
This could be provided by the integration of NSRF reporting within the new ‘European 
semester’ framework of Europe 2020 reporting. Additionally, there is a need for more 
proactive involvement of regions in the strategic reporting exercise and to open it up to 
other interested actors (local authorities, cities, socio-economic partners, NGOs etc.). A 
coherent and comparable methodological framework of core indicators is required from the 
start of the next period.  
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ANNEX I: EARMARKING CATEGORIES  YELLOW (ALL OBJ), ORANGE 
(CONVERGENCE ONLY), WHITE (NON-EARMARKED) 
 
 
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT (R&TD), INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
1. R&TD activities in research centres  
2. R&TD infrastructure (including physical plant, instrumentation and high-speed computer networks linking research centres) 
and centres of competence in a specific technology 
3. Technology transfer and improvement of cooperation networks between small businesses (SMEs), between these and 
other businesses and universities, post-secondary education establishments of all kinds, regional authorities, research 
centres and scientific and technological poles (scientific and technological parks, technopoles, etc.) 
4. Assistance to R&TD, particularly in SMEs (including access to R&TD services in research centres) 
5. Advanced support services for firms and groups of firms 
6. Assistance to SMEs for the promotion of environmentally-friendly products and production processes (introduction of 
effective environment managing system, adoption and use of pollution prevention technologies, integration of clean 
technologies into firm production) 
7. Investment in firms directly linked to research and innovation (innovative technologies, establishment of new firms by 
universities, existing R&TD centres and firms, etc.) 
8. Other investment in firms 
9. Other measures to stimulate research and innovation and entrepreneurship in SMEs 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 
10. Telephone infrastructures (including broadband networks) 
11. Information and communication technologies (access, security, interoperability, risk-prevention, research, innovation, e-
content, etc.) 
12. Information and communication technologies (TEN-ICT) 
13. Services and applications for the citizen (e-health, e-government, e-learning, e-inclusion, etc.) 
14. Services and applications for SMEs (e-commerce, education and training, networking, etc.) 
15 Other measures for improving access to and efficient use of ICT by SMEs 
TRANSPORT  
16. Railways 
17. Railways (TEN-T) 
18. Mobile rail assets 
19. Mobile rail assets (TEN-T) 
20. Motorways 
21. Motorways (TEN-T) 
22. National roads 
23. Regional/local roads 
24. Cycle tracks 
25. Urban transport 
26. Multimodal transport 
27. Multimodal transport (TEN-T) 
28. Intelligent transport systems 
29. Airports 
30. Ports 
31. Inland waterways (regional and local) 
32. Inland waterways (TEN-T) 
ENERGY 
33. Electricity 
34. Electricity (TEN-E) 
35. Natural gas 
36. Natural gas (TEN-E) 
37. Petroleum products 
38. Petroleum products (TEN-E) 
39. Renewable energy: wind 
40. Renewable energy: solar  
41. Renewable energy: biomass 
42. Renewable energy: hydroelectric, geothermal and other 
43. Energy efficiency, co-generation, energy management 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RISK PREVENTION 
44. Management of household and industrial waste 
45. Management and distribution of water (drinking water) 
46. Water treatment (waste water) 
47. Air quality 
48. Integrated prevention and pollution control  
49. Mitigation and adaptation to climate change 
50. Rehabilitation of industrial sites and contaminated land 
51. Promotion of biodiversity and nature protection (including Natura 2000) 
52. Promotion of clean urban transport  
53. Risk prevention (including the drafting and implementation of plans and measures to prevent and manage natural and 
technological risks) 
54. Other measures to preserve the environment and prevent risks 
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TOURISM 
55. Promotion of natural assets 
56. Protection and development of natural heritage 
57. Other assistance to improve tourist services 
CULTURE 
58. Protection and preservation of the cultural heritage 
59. Development of cultural infrastructure 
60 Other assistance to improve cultural services 
URBAN AND RURAL REGENERATION 
61. Integrated projects for urban and rural regeneration 
INCREASING THE ADAPTABILITY OF WORKERS AND FIRMS, ENTERPRISES AND ENTREPRENEURS 
62. Development of life-long learning systems and strategies in firms; training and services for employees to step up their 
adaptability to change; promoting entrepreneurship and innovation 
63. Design and dissemination of innovative and more productive ways of organising work 
64. Development of specific services for employment, training and support in connection with restructuring of sectors and 
firms, and development of systems for anticipating economic changes and future requirements in terms of jobs and skills  
IMPROVING ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY 
65. Modernisation and strengthening labour market institutions 
66. Implementing active and preventive measures on the labour market  
67.Measures encouraging active ageing and prolonging working lives 
68. Support for self-employment and business start-up 
69. Measures to improve access to employment and increase sustainable participation and progress of women in 
employment to reduce gender-based segregation in the labour market, and to reconcile work and private life, such as 
facilitating access to childcare and care for dependent persons 
70. Specific action to increase migrants’ participation in employment and thereby strengthen their social integration 
IMPROVING THE SOCIAL INCLUSION OF LESS-FAVOURED PERSONS 
71. Pathways to integration and re-entry into employment for disadvantaged people; combating discrimination in accessing 
and progressing in the labour market and promoting acceptance of diversity at the workplace 
IMPROVING HUMAN CAPITAL 
72. Design, introduction and implementation of reforms in education and training systems in order to develop employability, 
improving the labour market relevance of initial and vocational education and training, updating skills of training personnel 
with a view to innovation and a knowledge based economy 
73. Measures to increase participation in education and training throughout the life-cycle, including through action to achieve 
a reduction in early school leaving, gender-based segregation of subjects and increased access to and quality of initial 
vocational and tertiary education and training 
74. Developing human potential in the field of research and innovation, in particular through post-graduate studies and 
training of researchers, and networking activities between universities, research centres and businesses 
INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
75. Education infrastructure  
76. Health infrastructure 
77. Childcare infrastructure  
78. Housing infrastructure 
79. Other social infrastructure 
MOBILISATION FOR REFORMS IN THE FIELDS OF EMPLOYMENT AND INCLUSION 
80. Promoting partnerships, pacts and initiatives through the networking of relevant stakeholders 
STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY  
81. Mechanisms for improving good policy and programme design, monitoring and evaluation at national, regional and local 
level, capacity building in the delivery of policies and programmes. 
REDUCTION OF ADDITIONAL COSTS HINDERING THE OUTERMOST REGIONS  
82. Compensation of any additional costs due to accessibility deficit and territorial fragmentation 
83. Specific action addressed to compensate additional costs due to size market factors 
84. Support to compensate additional costs due to climate conditions and relief difficulties 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
85. Preparation, implementation, monitoring and inspection  
86. Evaluation and studies; information and communication 
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Improving the Quality of Structural Funds 
 Programme Management 
through Exchange of Experience 
IQ-Net is a network of Convergence and Regional Competitiveness programmes actively 
exchanging experience on practical programming issues. It involves a programme of 
research and debate on topical themes relating to Structural Funds programme design, 
management and delivery, culminating in twice-yearly meetings of members. IQ-Net was 
established in 1996 and has successfully completed three periods of operation: 1996-99, 
1999-2002 and 2002-07. The fourth phase has been running from 2007 to the end of 2010. 
IQ-Net Meetings  
27 partners’ meetings and a special 10th 
anniversary conference have been held in twelve 
European countries during 14 years of operation 
of the Network. Meetings are held at 
approximately six-month intervals and are open 
to IQ-Net partners and to observers interested in 
joining the Network. The meetings are designed 
to facilitate direct exchange of experience on 
selected issues, through the presentation of 
briefing papers, plenary discussions, workshop 
sessions and study visits in the hosting regions. 
 
 
IQ-Net Website 
The IQ-Net Website is the Network’s main vehicle of communication for partners and the 
public (www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet). The launch of Phase IV has been accompanied by an 
extensive redesign of the site which comprises two sections: 
 
 
Partner Intranet Pages available exclusively to 
IQ-Net members.  
 
Public Pages which provide information on the 
Network’s activities and meetings, allow the 
download of IQ-Net Reports and Bulletins, and 
provide a news section on issues relevant to the 
Network. 
 
The Partners’ section of the website provides exclusive services to members of the 
Network, including access to all materials prepared for the IQ-Net meetings, a list of EU27 
links (programmes, institutions, economics and statistics etc.), partners’ contact details, a 
partners’ blog and other items of interest. 
IQ-Net Reports 
The IQ-Net Reports form the basis for the discussions at each IQ-Net meeting. They present 
applied and practical information in a style accessible to policy-makers, programme 
executives and administrators. The reports can be downloaded, at no charge, from the IQ-
Net website. To date, 26 thematic papers have been produced on both ‘functional issues’ 
(e.g. management arrangements, partnership, information and communication, monitoring 
systems) and ‘thematic issues’ (e.g. innovation, enterprise development, tourism). A 
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similar number of papers have also been produced to review developments in the 
implementation of the Network’s partner programmes. 
 
IQ-Net Thematic Papers 
x The Reform of Cohesion Policy after 2013 
x New Partnership Dynamics in a Changing Cohesion Policy Context 
x Pandora’s Box and the Delphic Oracle: EU Cohesion Policy and State Aid Compliance 
x The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU Cohesion Policy: Contrasting Views 
on Challenges, Idiosyncrasies and the Way Ahead 
x From Environmental Sustainability to Sustainable Development? Making Concepts 
Tangible in Structural Funds Programmes 
x Making sense of European Cohesion Policy: 2007-13 on-going evaluation and monitoring 
x Turning ideas into action: the implementation of 2007-13 programmes 
x The New Generation of Operational Programmes, 2007-2013 
x National Strategic Reference Frameworks and OPs, 2007-2013 
x Preparations for the Programme Period 2007-13 
x Territorial Cohesion and Structural Funds 
x Cohesion Policy Funding for Innovation and the Knowledge Economy 
x The Added Value of Structural Funds 
x Information, Publicity and Communication 
x Mid-term Evaluation of the 2000-06 Programmes 
x Mainstreaming Horizontal Themes into Structural Fund Programming 
x The Structural Funds: Facilitating the Information Society 
x Information into Intelligence: Monitoring for Effective Structural Fund Programming 
x At the Starting Block: Review of the New Programmes 
x Tourism and Structural Funds 
x Preparations for the New Programmes 
x The New Regulations and Programming 
x Strategic Approaches to Regional Innovation 
x Effective Responses to Job Creation 
x The Evolution of Programmes and Future Prospects 
x Equal Opportunities in Structural Fund Programmes 
x The Contribution of Meso-Partnerships to Structural Fund Implementation 
x Regional Environmental Integration: Changing Perceptions and Practice  
x Structural Fund Synergies: ERDF and ESF 
x The Interim Evaluation of Programmes 
x Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Practice 
x Generating Good Projects 
x RTD and In vation in Programmes no
IQ-Net Bulletin  
The IQ-Net Bulletin promotes the dissemination of the Network’s activities 
and results. Fourteen issues have been published to date, over the period 
from 1996 to 2009. Bulletins are published using a standard format, with 
each providing summaries of the research undertaken and reports on the 
discussions which take place at IQ-Net meetings. The Bulletins can be 
downloaded from the IQ-Net website (public pages). A printed version is 
also sent out to the IQ-Net mailing list.  
 
Membership of the IQ-Net Network is open to national and regional Structural Funds 
Managing Authorities and programme secretariats. For further information or to express an 
interest, contact Professor John Bachtler (john.bachtler@strath.ac.uk) or Laura Polverari 
(laura.polverari@strath.ac.uk. 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 27(2)  European Policies Research Centre 74
